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## THE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON PROTESTANT MISSIONS

JAMES L. BARTON

BOSTON

One would be indeed presumptuous to predict the effect of this war upon foreign missionary operations. Indeed, to report fully the present effect of this world war upon the work of the various foreign missionary societies of the world is an impossible task. Missionary leaders are, however, attempting to estimate the significance of the present bearing of war conditions, while few would be so bold as to suggest even what the future may be.

That foreign missionaries and their operations are seriously and fundamentally affected all will agree. It could hardly be otherwise when nearly every country in which foreign missionaries and their institutions are located is under the flag of one of the belligerent powers, and much mission territory is actually within the zone of war or of active military preparations. Within the war zone are the mission fields of the Balkan Peninsula, all of the Turkish Empire, Syria, Arabia, Egypt, Persia, all of the former German colonies in Africa, and the islands of the Pacific held by Germany at the outbreak of the war, while North Africa, Ceylon, India, Burmah, Siam, British South Africa, and Portuguese East and West Africa are upon the borderland of war or of direct

preparation for war. Beyond these areas all that remains of Africa, all of China, Japan, extensive sections of South America, and the Philippine Islands, as well as other lesser territories, are under a flag of one of the Allies and so are within the war field and subject to special war regulations. We can mention here but few of the conditions which have especially confronted foreign missionary enterprises during the last four years, some of which have been fundamental to future work, while others are only incidental and will quickly pass when war conditions cease.

### I. EXTERNAL CONDITIONS

The first missionary areas to be seriously disturbed were the four German colonies in Africa and the German possessions in the Pacific Islands. These colonies and the Islands were the field of Protestant missionary operations, largely of British, American, and German missionaries. The Allies at once made attack upon these colonies and, in practically every instance, the missionary areas were invaded and the mission stations were occupied by one party or the other and made the base of military activities. Great hardship was suffered by some of the missionaries, especially the British, when invaded by the Germans, although the German missionaries make fully as strong complaint against their treatment at the hands of British and French invaders. The German missions were more depleted since German missionaries of military age were called upon to join the fighting forces and, in some fields, nearly the entire German male missionary body was transferred to the ranks and the mission work was left without much male supervision. The native Christians too were seriously involved. A British war vessel visited a station of one of the American Mission Boards with direction to take on board the



American missionaries. After due deliberation the missionaries replied, that as they were at the place of duty and opportunity, they had unanimously decided to remain in spite of the friendly offer of the Admiral to carry them to a place of safety. The Admiral removed his hat and replied, "Many a man today wears the Victoria Cross for acts of heroism far less worthy than that which you exhibit." While the missionaries suffered necessarily many hardships, no violent deaths have been reported, and after the colonies had been entirely overcome by the Allies, the work settled down to more normal conditions.

In the Balkan Peninsula, an area fought over since 1912 more than any other section of the world, mission work has been very little disturbed. There are mission stations in the Balkan Peninsula that have been under four different flags in the last six years. Monastir, for instance, was under the Turkish flag in 1912. This flag was replaced by the Bulgarian in the first Balkan war and that by the Serbian flag in the second Balkan war in 1913 and now by the French flag. None of the parties taking possession of the country have materially interfered with missionary work. The Bulgarian government was wholly friendly. The Serbian government was somewhat suspicious but not hostile.

Turkey has differed from all others connected with the war because it has experienced atrocities such as the world has seldom before witnessed, while at the same time it has been the field of military operations of the first order. The war has raged in the west about the Dardanelles, in the southeast in Syria and Mesopotamia, and in the northeast along the Russian and Persian border. From twenty-five to thirty per cent of the missionaries who were there at the outbreak of the war have remained. About five per cent of those who remained have died during this war period, most of them

from typhus, typhoid, and cholera. The character of the work was materially changed owing to the unprecedented conditions.

The Persian situation has differed little from the Turkish except that Persia has been outside of the real war zone, although the northern section of the country has been fought over by Russian, Turkish, and Allied troops and there have been many local disturbances which have at times threatened the life of the missionaries. Irresponsible mobs have taken possession of some mission stations, as at Tabriz, where the Presbyterian Hospital was sacked together with the American Consulate.

The missionary enterprise throughout the world has suffered seriously from the loss of man-power. Many missionaries, recognizing as paramount the call of their country, have withdrawn temporarily from missionary service and taken up some form of war work. Some of the Mission Boards in Great Britain and Canada have lost in this way more than fifty per cent of their male missionaries of war age. So far as reported, the American missionary societies have not lost that number, but the Mission Boards have taken the position that they would throw no obstacle in the way of any missionary who wished to enter military service. The number of new appointees has necessarily been reduced. From twenty to thirty is the age when most missionaries are appointed, and, while theological students and ordained men are exempt from the draft, there were many who did not wish to claim this exemption. Many Mission Boards are sending out for educational, industrial, and medical work men who are not ordained and who thus would not be exempt. It is an interesting fact that some of these missionaries have been given their release from military service on the ground that the service they contemplated rendering in the mission field was calculated to aid



materially in winning the war. There have been many interesting cases of this character, showing the breadth of the Exemption Boards in their recognition of the work of the foreign missionaries as international agencies working in the interests of international brotherhood and good understanding.

The German missions have probably suffered more from a loss of man-power than any others, because a larger percentage of their missionaries were bound by military regulations to take their place in the ranks whenever their country called for their services. It has already been stated that in the German colonies in Africa a large number of the German missionaries joined the military forces. This was true of many who were at home on furlough and of others who were deported from their mission fields early in the war. At the same time, it was impossible for the Mission Boards in Germany to communicate with their mission fields, so that missionaries even past the military age who were caught at their home-base could not return and, in fact, their return was forbidden in all cases where their mission territory came under the flag of a country at war with Germany. The effect therefore of the war upon the man-power and support of German missions has been disastrous. This condition has attracted the attention of the British and American missionary societies, and considerable sums of money have been raised, both in Great Britain and the United States, to conserve the German work, and the Government of India has been most liberal in its treatment of these missions.

The financial loss of the missions has been great, caused by the increased cost of nearly all commodities everywhere. No part of the world is free from the apparently universal advance in the price of foodstuffs, labor, and of wearing apparel. This has compelled the increase of the annual allowance for the support of missionaries.

At the same time, the cost of transportation, both of the missionary and his supplies, has more than doubled, and to this is to be added the increase of cost of exchange, brought about chiefly by the rise in the price of silver. As an illustration, the year before the war exchange in China went as high as \$2.15 in silver for one dollar gold. Since the war began the price has been falling rapidly so that it has reached, according to latest reports, the unprecedented figure of a little better than one dollar silver for one dollar gold. As all payments in China are made in silver, this item alone has nearly doubled the expenditure of missionary funds in that country in order to maintain the work upon its former basis.

The movement of missionaries has been severely hampered by war conditions. Necessarily the Government has been compelled to put new and stringent restrictions upon the issuing of passports since the passport privilege has been abused by representatives of the Central Powers. In addition to this, Great Britain, because of her disastrous experience with German missionaries, put restrictions upon the entrance of missionaries from countries other than Great Britain into British possessions. For instance, if a Mission Board wishes to send a missionary into India, whether he is a new appointee or a veteran returning to his field of labor, application for permission must be made through the British Embassy at Washington. This application properly vouched for is sent to India through England and, after investigation in India as well as in the United States, if nothing appears against the candidate, permission for going to India is granted. A passport cannot be secured from the United States government until this permission is obtained. This has caused much delay and has also excluded from British colonies many missionaries of German descent. Other difficulties have appeared in the form of limited facilities for travel. Steamship lines



have been reduced in number, until it has become almost impossible to secure passage for a missionary or missionary family to cross either the Atlantic or the Pacific without waiting for several months. The northern Atlantic has been closed to missionary travel, but the southern Atlantic still remains open, while there have been no restrictions upon the Pacific except such as are caused by lack of passenger service.

## II. THE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON MISSION WORK IN TURKEY AND PERSIA

The most striking illustration of the effect of the war upon mission work in Turkey will be discussed under the head of "The Effect of the War on the Mohammedan World." At the outbreak of the war Turkey was occupied as a mission field principally by the Presbyterian Board of Missions, carrying on extensive work in Syria and Palestine, and the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, conducting work across Asia Minor, through Armenia and Kurdistan and down into northern Syria. This work was established about a century ago, and out of it had grown not only a large number of churches but an extensive medical work and educational institutions of national and international repute. When missionaries entered the country there was not a vestige of modern education to be found throughout the land. It was inevitable that men and women trained in our best American colleges and universities should there lay the foundation for a thorough education for all classes. The Armenians were the first to respond, followed by the Bulgarians of the western part of the country and of Macedonia, and then the Greeks, the Mohammedans coming last. Besides the large number of hospitals under American missionary physicians of the highest standing, there have grown up

a long list of notable colleges, like the Syrian Protestant College at Beirût, Euphrates College at Harpût, Robert College at Constantinople, the American College for Girls at Constantinople, the International College at Smyrna, Anatolia College at Marsovan, Aintab College at Aintab, St. Paul's Institute at Tarsus, Central Turkey College for Girls at Marash, and last and perhaps least the American College at Van, just beginning its career as a college at the beginning of the war. In addition to these colleges were several times their number of preparatory schools and academies, much more widely distributed throughout the country. At the outbreak of the war, in these higher intermediate and primary schools in Turkey, directly under the control and direction of Americans, most of whom were missionaries, there were nearly thirty thousand of the best and brightest young men and women of Turkey receiving a modern education.

There was some work carried on by British societies in Mesopotamia and in the vicinity of Constantinople, and German missionaries, for some fifteen years previous to the outbreak of the war, had been carrying on limited missionary operations. The Germans had been strengthening their missions continuously during the entire period, they having begun there after the massacres of Armenians in 1895-6 and the friendly alliance created by the visit of the Kaiser to Abdul Hamid in 1898. All this work had been established under what are known in the diplomatic world as concessions and capitulations. Turkey was loath to make treaties with western Powers, it being contrary to the dignity and rights of the Caliph of Islam, the Sultan of Turkey, thus to bind himself. Concessions were made which theoretically, at least upon the part of the Sultan, might be abrogated at will. Under these concessions foreigners were allowed to come into the country, missionary work was especially recog-



nized, and more or less foreign business had been built up between Turkey and the western nations. Missionary, medical, educational, and charitable institutions which had been founded during the last sixty years, had been established under privileges granted by these concessions and capitulations.

Within a month after the war began and before Turkey had actually joined the belligerents, the capitulations were abrogated by an official proclamation which diplomatically and legally left no standing whatever for any foreign institution within Turkey. There were no laws and no treaties by which foreign property and foreigners themselves could claim protection. The proclamation of abrogation demanded that all foreigners and all foreign property should come at once under Turkish law, and that foreigners should have no right of appeal to their consuls or ambassadors. If these conditions had been immediately and strictly carried out, it would have caused the destruction of all missionary work. The American ambassador, joining with all of the other ambassadors in Turkey, including the German, made strenuous protest against such a step on the part of Turkey, claiming, as they had a right to claim, that the capitulations and concessions were virtually treaties and that they could not be abrogated without the consent of all parties concerned. The decree of abrogation was not carried out in all details. Missionaries did appeal to their consuls and to their ambassadors. While local officials in some of the interior stations overstepped their rights, breaking the seal of American consuls and taking possession of American schools, the central Government gradually yielded to the arguments of the ambassadors and issued a series of regulations which were afterward materially modified, so that missionary work was not vitally interfered with. Much credit is due to Ambassador Morgenthau for his strenuous and effective protest

with the Turkish officials against any such drastic treatment of American interests in Turkey. At the time the order of abrogation was issued there were from eight to ten million dollars' worth of property in Turkey owned by American missionaries and American educational institutions. This was in the form of educational, medical, printing, industrial, and religious plants with their buildings and equipment, including the residences of Americans engaged in the conduct of the different forms of work. Back of these plants there was a total of investment of not less than forty millions of dollars covering nearly a century of endeavor in the country.

Attention was very soon turned from controversy over the abolition of the capitulations to the atrocities which Turkey, under the leadership of Germany, began to perpetrate, first against the Armenians and later upon Syrians and Greeks. This attack upon the Armenians, who comprised the larger part of the student and teaching force and working Christian body in Asiatic Turkey, struck a direct blow at the educational and missionary work. Native professors in American colleges, teachers, pastors, leaders, and students in the educational institutions were seized by the thousands, some of them horribly tortured, many put to death, while others were sent into exile down into Syria and northern Arabia. The story of these atrocities is too well known to require repetition here. The effect upon educational work in the interior of Turkey was paralyzing, as in the College at Aintab, Euphrates College at Harpût, and the College at Van. Nearly every Armenian teacher was at once eliminated and the older students either taken into the army, exiled, or killed.

The missionaries remained on the ground and used their influence as far as they were able to counteract the disastrous effect of this atrocious attack. They were recognized as the defenders of the Christian populations



against the Government measure of extermination. Relief funds were furnished them from the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief in the United States, and from that time to this large numbers of them have given a greater part of their time and strength to the carrying out of measures of relief, by the aid of over \$5,000,000 of funds provided from America.

After the first attack against American institutions and their native constituencies, a constantly increasing number of Mohammedan officials seemed to begin to realize something of the heinousness of their acts and so consequently to withdraw their opposition. They began to afford the missionaries a measure of coöperation; for instance, the Syrian Protestant College at Beirût received much help from Djemal Pasha, a former member of the Young Turk Cabinet and later commander of the Fourth Turkish Army Corps that was operating against Egypt and the Allied forces in Syria. Through him, in the face of difficult food conditions, supplies were secured and the College was able to carry on its work with a larger number of students than it has had before in its history. This increase of students was partly due to the closing of British and French schools at Beirût, and also to the feeling on the part of many parents that the safest place for their children was in the American school. This same condition prevailed also in Constantinople, and Robert College and the American College for Girls have been overwhelmed with students in spite of the increased cost of living. According to latest reports Robert College had more than fifty per cent increase in its student body, as did the American College for Girls, and Talaat Pasha, then Grand Vizier, was giving much assistance in obtaining fuel and food. The International College in Smyrna, although its president is a British subject, has continued its work uninterruptedly. It has been compelled to

reduce the number of students it could accept owing to its shortened teaching force and limited finances, but the president reports this last year to be one of the most encouraging and promising in the history of the College. Institutions in the interior have not fared so well. Anatolia College at Marsovan lost most of its faculty and its student body. Only the Greeks remained after the first onslaught on the College. Nearly a year before the breaking of diplomatic relations between Turkey and the United States the entire missionary force at Marsovan was removed by the government under military order, but later four members of the station were allowed to return and the work for girls was resumed, but the boys' college has remained closed. Euphrates College at Harpût remained open, although no work of college grade was carried on after the first attack. This work was suspended when diplomatic relations were broken with the United States.

It has been impossible for the last two years to send out of the country any detailed reports of the progress of the work, but between one and two hundred Americans, missionaries and teachers and physicians, have remained in the country, continuing the educational and medical work as far as possible but devoting themselves primarily to acting as agents for reaching with measures of relief the starving, stricken, exiled peoples of that country. These have remained in spite of the urgent demand of Ambassador Elkus, at the time when diplomatic relations with the United States were broken, that they all should withdraw from the country. The State Department even demanded that all Americans should come out, but this large company of men and women, in spite of the possibility that the United States might soon be at war with Turkey, decided to stay where, they declared, they believed they could render the largest service to humanity and the world. They were conscious



of the fact that should they withdraw, these suffering scores of thousands of people would be left without aid and at the mercy of any one who wished to attack them.

Many have died during this war period, of disease incident to the country. Of the missionaries of the American Board alone seven have died of typhus, and possibly eight. The death of seven others who were not physically strong was undoubtedly hastened by the severe strain upon them. One, Mrs. G. C. Reynolds, died through an accident incurred on the flight of the missionaries from Van preceding its re-capture by the Turks. Two suffered probably a violent death, although the case of Mr. George P. Knapp, a graduate of Harvard University in the class of 1887, might have been a case of typhus. The truth will undoubtedly remain a secret. Two Presbyterian missionaries in Syria died, one of typhus and the other of cholera.

In Persia the situation has been somewhat similar to that in Turkey, although Persia has not been within the actual western war zone. Its northern territory has been overrun by both Turkish and Russian troops, and the Kurdish element got out of control and added to the terror of the situation. Six of the Persian Presbyterian missionaries died of typhus and cholera, but most of them are there on the ground today, administering relief as far as they are able to the starving population of more than one million souls. In both Turkey and Persia the fact that missionaries have remained at their posts of service in the midst of peril from disease and in many cases from violence, when it was fully known to the authorities and to the Mohammedan populations that they not only had the privilege of withdrawing to their homeland but were even ordered by their government to do so, has had a mighty influence on the thinking of the Mohammedans. This example of missionary

heroism and devotion, never surpassed in the history of Christian missions, is leading to most serious thought on the part of Moslems. They recognize in this act a vast difference between Islam and Christianity, and while they may reject the preaching of the missionaries and declare impracticable many of the demands of the gospel of Christ, they cannot deny the fact that these Christian missionaries coming to their country in the name of the Christ have exhibited Him with mighty power in the lives of sacrifice and peril they have lived and in the heroic deaths they have died. Through these conditions a message of surpassing power and influence has been delivered and is still being delivered to the Moslem populations of these two great Mohammedan countries.

### III. THE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON THE MOHAMMEDAN WORLD

There is reason for referring to Mohammedanism as the "Mohammedan world," although followers of Mohammed are widely scattered among many different peoples, speaking various tongues and occupying but a mere fragment of the world's surface under Mohammedan governments. Nevertheless, the unity that has prevailed among Mohammedans in creed, practice, ideals, and expectations, no matter what their language or nationality, has given ground at least for the expression. Also the Mohammedans have presented an organized, unified resistance to the Christian approach to such an extent that it has seemed like the resistance of a single body united with one purpose. This resistance has been so persistent that the Christian approach to the Mohammedans has made but little general progress in the past and the Christianization of the Mohammedans has been almost the despair of missionary organizations. Moham-



medanism, in extending itself among pagan peoples, as in Africa, and in propagating its faith among the non-Moslem populations among which Mohammedans have dwelt, has made much use of the argument that Mohammedanism is a unit, undivided, with a single ideal and purpose, more unified than any other religion and ultimately bound through its unity of creed and effort to win the entire world.

This was the state of affairs at the outbreak of the war, and it was a condition that Germany made deep plans to use in prosecuting the war. There is evidence to show that it was Germany's purpose to fire the Mohammedan world with a mighty *jihad* that would paralyze civilization. The well-known effort inaugurated through the Sheik-ul-Islam and the Sultan of Turkey acting as the Caliph of Islam, has passed into history. Its failure was a surprise to the entire world, bringing consternation to Germany. The alliance of Turkey with so-called Christian Germany and Austria has estranged Turkey, as the only existing Mohammedan government of recognized significance, from the other great national bodies of Islam. India, Egypt, the North African states, and other Mohammedan countries, repudiated the alliance and refused to join in a holy war under Turkey's leadership. The result has been the dismemberment of Mohammedanism as a centralized religious force. Never since the day of Mohammed has the Mohammedan world been so disrupted, disorganized, and destitute of religious leadership. After the shock of the refusal of the Mohammedans to respond to the call for a holy war, the next great cleavage thrust into the very centre of Mohammedanism was the disaffection of the Arabian tribes, their repudiation of Turkey and their affiliation with the Allies. The chief significance of the separation of Arabia from Turkey lies in the fact that the sacred places of Islam—Mecca and Medina—are located in

Arabia, and the Sultan of Turkey for centuries has been recognized as the keeper and protector of these sacred shrines.

As the direct result of this endeavor of Turkey under German leadership to precipitate a holy war, we find that Mohammedanism has lost its Caliph and is now without an accepted religious head. The Mohammedans of India, Egypt, and, in fact, nearly all parts of the world, have either tacitly or officially repudiated the Sultan of Turkey as the Caliph of Islam, a position which he has held for four centuries or more. This leaves Mohammedans without a recognized leader, while the Mohammedans of India and Egypt have declared their loyalty to Great Britain, thus breaking the centralized political power of Mohammedanism, in addition to its disrupted religious solidarity.

Arabia, under the leadership of the Sherif of Mecca, has officially and religiously rejected the Sultan as the Caliph and has assumed absolute control of the sacred shrines of Islam. The Sherif has set himself up as the King of the Hedjaz and the legitimate and proper protector of Mecca and Medina. In his proclamation to the Mohammedan world he severely condemns the Sultan of Turkey as the Caliph of Islam for the action taken in calling a holy war in conjunction with Germany. To the present time no Mohammedan country or Mohammedan leader has come forward as the defender of the Sultan or his claim upon the Caliphate.

There is no agreement among the Mohammedans upon a Caliph. The law of Mohammedanism would seem to demand that the Caliph shall be the ruler of an independent Mohammedan country, as he is supposed to be not only the religious but the political head of his people. At the present time the only ruler of what may be called an independent Mohammedan kingdom is the Sherif of Mecca, self-proclaimed as the King of the Hedjaz, two



small provinces in Arabia upon the Red Sea but in which are located Mecca and Medina. Whether or not the Mohammedans will recognize the King of the Hedjaz as the Caliph remains to be seen, but apart from him there seems to be no available candidate.

Thus it is apparent that the organic religious and political unity of the Mohammedan world has been shattered, so that no longer can Moslems present a united front in opposition to Christianity or of any other religion, nor can they exercise political power for intimidating Mohammedans who are inclined to turn away from their ancestral faith and consider the contents and claims of Christianity. Already there are indications of a new sense of liberty and freedom in some countries, which is but a part of the movement so prevalent in the world today from autocracy toward democracy. It indicates a desire and a purpose on the part of many Mohammedans at least to exercise their own judgment and to demand liberty of action in religious matters.

This state of affairs would seem to open the door of approach for the Christian teacher and preacher more favorably than it has ever been open since the days of Mohammed. Mohammedans are beginning to realize that their solidarity is broken, that their hope of universal Mohammedan rule over the world is shattered forever. Intelligent Mohammedans are recognizing the fact that Mohammedanism does not contain those elements of strength which furnish an adequate religious motive and ideal for any society, much less for a State. This has brought to them a sense of discouragement and in many places almost of despair for the future of their faith. There are many indications that large groups of Mohammedans are ready to inquire sincerely and earnestly into the principles of Christianity and what it promises to its followers. There has never been a time since Christianity came into open conflict with Islam when conditions

seemed so favorable for a wise, judicious, united approach to the Mohammedan world with the message of Christianity. There are no people who need more the gospel of sanitation, of industry, of brotherhood, of intelligence, of sacrifice, and of consecration than do the Mohammedans. The task is a colossal one, involving the approach to fully one-seventh of this world's population, dwelling largely within or near the tropics, prejudiced and fanatical. It is too great for any one communion to undertake; it is too important to be undertaken by all communions acting separately. There are many who feel and believe that through this war and its effect upon Mohammedanism as well as upon Christianity at home, the time has come for a united effort on the part of the Christian world to approach the Mohammedan world in a way that will win their confidence and gradually their coöperation and ultimately their allegiance. The most fundamental effect of this war upon the non-Christian world is that of its influence upon Mohammedanism, constituting a new challenge to the Christian Church.

#### IV. THE EFFECT OF THE WAR UPON THE GERMAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS MOHAMMEDANISM

In German colonies in Africa at the outbreak of the war there were less than two million Mohammedans. Apart from these colonies German territory had practically no Mohammedan population. The Christians of Germany were deeply interested in Mohammedan problems and in missionary endeavor to reach the people of that faith. In 1910 a German Colonial Congress was held in Hamburg in which the Moslem peril in East Africa was seriously discussed. After the discussion the Congress adopted the following resolution:

"Since the progress of Islam in our colonies is accompanied by grave perils, this Colonial Congress recommends a thorough study



of Moslem propagandism. The Congress is thoroughly convinced that everything which favors the progress of Islam and hinders the progress of Christianity should be avoided, and especially commends the cultural efforts of missionary education and hospital work to the support of the Colonial Government. We also recognize in the Moslem peril an urgent challenge to German Christianity to occupy the regions threatened by Islam with missionary effort."

It is an interesting fact that in this conference there were Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Socialistic leaders. The clear-cut utterance of the resolution above quoted does not tally well with the fact that for the last twenty years the Kaiser has made no utterance, so far as records show, that would in any way offend the most fanatical Mohammedan. When the war began it was evident that Germany was putting much reliance upon her relations with Turkey as *the* central Mohammedan power. The German Government went so far as to plan with Turkey for calling a holy war. Germany placed much dependence upon the uprising of the two hundred and thirty millions of Mohammedans in a real alliance with Germany, thus striking a fatal blow at Great Britain, France, Italy, and Russia, each of whom had large Mohammedan populations under its flag. England alone ruled over ninety-one millions of Mohammedans, of which sixty-seven millions were in India.

Soon after the alliance between Germany and Turkey was established, Christian leaders in Germany began to show a different attitude toward Mohammedanism, as for instance, Professor Friedrich Delitzsch of Berlin; who, as early as the spring of 1915, in an address to a Berlin audience said:

"Islam, so far from being a barren and retrogressive faith, leaves the door wide open to religious, moral, and social progress, and therefore no German Christian need be ashamed of an alliance which, begun in time of war, will be cemented and bear worthy fruit in times of peace."

In a lecture delivered in the spring of the same year, Professor Wilhelm Hermann of Marburg said:

"We must be convinced that they [the Turks] understand us and we them. Were this not the case, our alliance would be a false and unworthy one. As Christians we can understand and reverence their religious convictions, and our future lies along the same road as theirs."

After discussing the alliance of Germany with Islam, at about the same period Professor Troeltsch said:

"Islam is thereby recognized as one of the great acknowledged religious world powers which can no longer be a missionary objective, but must be left, just as in the Christian world, to its own inner religious development. It is unlikely that this result will ever be reversed, and it will affect the treatment of the Moslem problem in our Colonial possessions. For all that, Christianity is of course not invalidated in the territories occupied by the white race, to which, apart from the Christian communities in our colonies, it seems bound to confine itself, though it is limited as regards its world mission. It seems to be conclusively established that humanity is distributed into distinct spheres of religious life, free henceforth to stimulate one another religiously but each bound to fulfil its own destiny. This will astonish or alarm no one who has already come to this conviction on general principles from a study of the history of religion, but it is now beginning to be universally evident from the course of historical events."

These quotations are sufficient to show the trend of thought among many of the religious leaders, but they do not represent the sentiment of all the Christian people of Germany. *Missions-Magazin*, of which Herr F. Würz is editor, took up the discussion, maintaining strongly that the German Government could make no alliance with a religion, and that the Christian people of Germany, in order to maintain loyalty to their country, were not to assume that Mohammedans do not need Christianity. In the midst of this discussion Herr Würz says:

"Our own share in the gospel of Christ may well be at stake, if, in the political alliance with the Mohammedan world, we lightly



esteem the incomparable treasure with which we have been endowed by God. That would mean, not the end of the world mission of Christianity, but certainly the end of our world mission on behalf of Christianity. It may be difficult for us when, as a natural consequence of political alliance, the consensus of public opinion is friendly toward Islam, to maintain our clear Christian consciousness with regard to that faith. But if we do, we may bring blessing to the Mohammedan world with which we are now outwardly so closely associated."

Professor Julius Richter of Berlin, editor of the *Allgemeine Missions Zeitschrift*, takes up the discussion, but not with the same clearness and emphasis as Herr Würz. In 1915 there was an assembly of the German Evangelical Missionary Committee to discuss this important question. Every German Evangelical Missionary Society was represented. Bishop Hennig, a member of the Continuation Committee of the Edinburgh Missionary Conference, presided. One of the most important questions discussed was, "What Missions may do in order to protect the home Churches from a wrong valuation of Islam." So far as is known, no resolutions were passed; but in reporting this Conference in the *Evangelisches Missions-Magazin* of June, 1916, Herr Schlunk of Hamburg, among other things, said:

"Wide circles of the German people not only stand in actual danger of placing an incorrect valuation upon the religion of Mohammed but they have already fundamentally fallen prey to this danger. Through a determined admiration of Islam they become equally determined to forget their own Christian position and believe that they are in this way fulfilling their obligation to the German cause. If one demands, however, that the Ottoman kingdom should be absolutely excluded from the sphere of missions, he seeks thereby to cut the vital nerve of all missionary work and to bring into question the essential superiority of Christianity to the non-Christian religions."

This question is still under discussion in Germany, but not so prominently as in the first year of the war. It

will remain to be seen whether, when the war is over, the Christians of Germany will have reached the conclusion that the Mohammedan world is outside of the sphere of their missionary activity. It is not improbable also that Great Britain may feel herself to be under special obligations to Mohammedans and to such a degree that there will be a tendency to put restriction upon missionary work among and for Mohammedans under the British flag. The fact that she rules over such a vast Mohammedan population and that the Mohammedans exert such a dominant influence, especially in India and Egypt, will undoubtedly lead many statesmen of Great Britain to raise the question as to whether Christian missionaries should not be excluded from undertaking any direct religious work for Mohammedans in these countries at least, if not in all other countries where Mohammedans are found in any considerable number. Such an attitude can be taken only under the mistaken supposition that Christian missionaries are a disturbing element when working among Moslems. Missionary Societies and Boards are eagerly watching the trend of events as they affect the relations of Moslems to the great missionary movement.

#### V. ENLARGED VISION OF MISSIONS IN RELATION TO THE STATE

The war is having a marked effect not only upon the administrative officers and missionaries of foreign mission organizations but also upon the constituency at large, by way of giving them all a new conception of the place of foreign missions in establishing, throughout Asia and in Africa, a civilization in harmony with the twentieth-century Christian ideals. The old conception that the foreign missionary went out to teach pagan peoples a creed in order to save them from the wrath to come, had

already become enlarged, during the last generation of missionary endeavor, to a more balanced conception of the sociological value of Christianity. Christian missionaries have been for the last two decades attempting scientifically to apply the principles of the gospel of Christ and the teachings of the New Testament to the society of the East, and this effort has not been without a large degree of success. The war, however, has brought to the front a new and enlarged phase of the missionary enterprise hardly dreamed of before, but now becoming important in the light of present-day questions. The missionaries and missionary administrators are recognizing that the gospel is not simply for the individual and for society, but that it is a gospel suited to the needs of the State. We are learning the same lessons also in the West. The principles that lie at the foundation of the most stupendous alliance of nations the world has ever seen are the principles taught in the New Testament. These are justice and righteousness in national administration, the right of the individual and of the small nation to live and to enjoy a large degree of liberty without fear or favor, the principle that the stronger nations are under God the natural protectors of the weaker nations. These principles are now at the front in the discussion of war questions and especially of questions looking to a permanent peace yet to be established. The discussion has already passed beyond that of the value of the principles of the gospel in the organization and conduct of the affairs of a nation, to international relations where nation deals with nation, so affecting the permanent peace of the world. This conception of international Christianity was perhaps thrust for the first time into diplomatic circles by our own Secretary, John Hay, when the great powers of Europe set about to partition China. He in the name of the United States Government protested against such partitioning. This protest



raised a storm of opposition among his fellow diplomats, on the ground that diplomacy as between nations must remain always and forever purely selfish. The statement was made that if the United States wished a portion of China, she should put in her claim and defend it, but if she did not, she had no right to lift her voice in the interests of the integrity of China for China's sake. It was maintained that such an attitude was unknown in international diplomacy. Secretary Hay held his position and saved China from dismemberment. The principle, however, did not seem to reach the inner consciousness of the national life of the world until the outbreak of the present war. The last two years have revealed a marvellous advance in the thinking of the civilized world upon the sisterhood of nations. The world is rapidly learning that when one nation suffers all suffer, that when one is prosperous all are prosperous in a proportionate degree. We are learning that no nation or country on earth can remain backward intellectually, morally, or nationally, and not to a degree become a dead weight and even a menace to the other nations of the world. This at once brings the whole subject up to the very door of the foreign missionary enterprise.

There are two illustrations now prominently before the world which may be given as concrete examples of the point under consideration.

A few years ago China, the oldest autocracy on the face of the earth, with enormous although undeveloped wealth at her disposal, and with a population twice in excess of that of any other nation, decided to throw off her autocracy, depose her Emperor, and establish a constitutional government. This decision was not made hastily, but followed extended discussions and long deliberation. When the decision was reached it seemed to carry with it practically the entire population of that great empire, and China quietly and unostentatiously

swung out from the number of hereditary monarchies into the circle of democracies. A constitution was adopted, a President was elected by the people, parliament assembled, laws were made for the government of the new republic, and all without any untoward disturbance. It is true there were riots in some parts of the empire, as there have always been since China has been known to the Western world, but no more. Foreign relations were not disturbed, foreign commerce was not interfered with, foreigners dwelling in the country did not regard their lives in peril or their property in jeopardy. For half a dozen years China has moved forward under a democratic form of government and only recently has elected a new President, without disturbance and apparently to the entire satisfaction of all of the people. As the great war developed, China, believing in democracy as the form of government best suited to her particular genius, joined the Allies, and at once became a force in winning this war for world justice, righteousness, brotherhood, and human freedom. Her men by the hundreds of thousands have gone to France and are there assisting to the limit of their power in the cause of her allies, and she was ready to furnish still larger forces for the achievement of victory.

Another and a more recent illustration of a movement in the same direction is that of Russia. She too decided to depose her time-honored monarch and become a democratic nation. This step was taken as one of the immediate results of the war. The Czar was dethroned amid scenes of riot and bloodshed, and almost immediately the greater part of the Russian Empire was thrown into disorder and anarchy reigned from Vladivostok to the North Sea. Russia withdrew from the war as a positive force in aid of the cause of the Allies and became an ally of the Central Powers. Foreign trade was paralyzed throughout the land. The lives of foreigners were im-



perilled and their property destroyed; no life was secure; law and order were abandoned and anarchy ruled. Russia became not only no help to the Allies but became a menace to the world.

One cannot examine these two illustrations of recent events in the national life of two countries which comprise together fully one-third of the world's total population, without raising the question as to what has made the difference between these two great nations, moving from an absolute monarchy to a democracy in the same general period. We at first might say that it was due largely to the religious and fundamental ideals of the two nations. We must remember, however, that China has always been classed as a pagan nation. Her people are largely Confucianists, Buddhists, and Taoists. These religions inculcate gentleness of action and friendliness of spirit. At the same time we must remember that Russia was a Christian country, controlled by a national Christian Church conspicuous among the churches of the world, with magnificent cathedrals and a great, far-reaching, powerful church organization. It is impossible to find in these two religious principles the reason why the fundamental change was made, in one instance in quietness and peace and in the other in riots and disorder.

If we go back for a century and look into the history of these two countries, we find that Christian missionaries entered China at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Bible was translated into the languages of the people; Christian institutions were established; schools were opened and Western learning was introduced, until gradually Western educational institutions, from the kindergarten to the college and university, stretched across China from south to north and from the east to the most remote province of the west. Chinese young men of the most daring spirit and of the broadest intellect soon

found their way to the West and took extensive courses of study in the best institutions of America and England. Preceding the adoption of the constitution by China, she adopted the system of Western learning which had been introduced into her borders by the missionaries. It became the education of the Government. Through this Western learning, in which constitutional government and modern history as well as the principles of Christianity were systematically and thoroughly taught, China saw a new light. Then when she began to long for a larger liberty in the making of her own laws and the administration of her own affairs, it was but natural that the country should turn to the young men who had been educated in mission institutions and in colleges and universities in the West, to assume places of leadership. These men had the confidence of the Chinese. The people were ready in a large degree to follow their leadership, and so when word went forth that China was to change her monarchy to a democracy these students of the West and of the constitutional governments of the world were called upon to prepare a constitution which when prepared was accepted, and China became free.

With Russia it was different. While the Bible in Russia was freely printed and freely distributed, there was no liberty given to the people to study constitutional government and modern history. No missionaries were allowed to enter the great Russian Empire and establish modern Christian schools upon the modern Christian basis. Russian students who had studied these great subjects abroad were not allowed to return, and if perchance any did reënter the country, their lives were in peril and in multitudes of cases their liberty was taken from them on the mere supposition that they were supporters of the doctrine of the rights of the people to have a voice in the making and execution of their own laws.

When Russia took the important step towards a democracy she had no leaders of adequate training and of safe ideals. Those who did assume control had been trained in the school of socialism and anarchy, into which the principles of justice and righteousness and brotherhood had not entered.

It does not require a great stretch of the imagination to picture what might have been the result had Russia at the beginning of the eighteenth century permitted American missionaries, men and women of the highest intellectual and spiritual equipment, with lofty ideals taught by the gospel of Christ, to enter her empire and establish there great outstanding modern educational and religious institutions. Then when her hour of crisis came she would have had men and women of moral and intellectual strength and of recognized leadership to lead Russia safely over the bar into the harbor of peace. I do not believe it is presumptuous to say that one of the outstanding differences between these two countries, in the method and results of their throwing off their monarchy and establishing a constitutional, democratic form of government, is due in large part, if not entirely, to the fact that Christian missionaries were given so large opportunity in China to promote those lofty ideals taught by Christ Himself and His disciples and to build them into institutions that have already become a part of China's national, social, and intellectual life, and that if they had had the same privileges in Russia for the same period, the outcome in Russia would have been wholly different from what it is today. Facts of this character are convincing the missionary leaders that the horizon of their vision must be enlarged to include a message to the nations as well as to the individual and to society. Much of the teaching in the New Testament, in the light of present history, not only can be interpreted in terms of the nation but we are rapidly learning that anything



short of such an interpretation is a clear misreading of the purpose and order of God.

## VI. WORLD DEMOCRACY AND MISSIONS

The last twelve years have recorded a rapid advance among the nations of the world from an autocratic to a democratic form of government. By democratic form of government we mean a government in which the people have a voice in deciding to what laws they shall be subject, the method by which these shall be executed, and by whom. President Wilson has given to the world the declaration that this war is now being fought to make the world safe for democracy. Twenty years ago but a small proportion of the world's population lived under a democratic form of government. The monarchy was the rule. A hundred years ago democracies were not only the exception but they were looked upon by most of the world as an experiment in government destined to disaster. Today more than twenty nations are joined together in a mighty alliance for the protection of democracy or, in other words, for the protection of the rule and rights of the people as against the divine right of kings.

There have been many instances in history where an autocracy has gone wrong. History is full of the records of kings deposed and their successors installed often by violence, the only remedy the people had for protection against a rule that was unjust and intolerable. This was remotely an expression of the spirit of democracy, but, however that may be, it was a remedy by which an autocrat gone wrong might be prevented from working evil in the world. It was the only recognized and known method of reform for an impossible autocrat. On the other hand, a democracy is the rule of the people. It is the people themselves, the majority under leadership, who decide what form the democracy shall take, who

shall guide it and under what laws. The success of a democracy depends upon the steadiness and intelligence of the people and upon their being actuated and inspired by the right ideals. It is not sufficient that the people shall have ideals. Germany was as thoroughly actuated by ideals as any country on the face of the earth at the outbreak of the war. These ideals had been taught to all her citizens from their youth up and had become a part of their inmost thinking; but the ideals were low, unworthy an intelligent people, and, when carried into action, became a menace to the world. We have found that when an autocracy goes wrong there is a remedy, but when a democracy goes wrong, it becomes a curse to itself and the world. While President Wilson announced that this war is being fought to make the world safe for democracy, undoubtedly if he were to express his thought on the subject at the present time, he would say it was to make democracy safe for itself and for the world.

The entire world is moving with startling rapidity toward a democratic form of government. While Japan maintains a monarchy, nevertheless the people of Japan have a large voice and strong influence in shaping Japan's national life. She has a constitutional government, a parliament elected by the people, and while the Emperor rules in Japan, nevertheless he would indeed be a brave and bold Emperor who would take any step that would run athwart the will and wishes of the people of Japan. In the Japanese press-discussions upon government plans for internal development or affecting relations with the outside nations, one sees nothing as to the opinion of the Emperor upon the subject. Japan has already reached that stage where the voice of the people is heard with authority and where the people's will is becoming the supreme will of the nation.

We have already referred to China where that vast population, having thrown off the rule of the aristocracy,

now come under a government of self-rule and self-determination. No words can be found to describe adequately the significance of China democratized, or what she may become with her resources of men and material wealth developed and her relations to the Far East, touching as she does upon one side the great Russia and the waters that connect Japan with India and, on the other side, bordering upon the Pacific Ocean over against the United States. China's place in world progress is one of portent far beyond the power of any prophet now to foresee.

Coming further west we find India with some 325,000,000 of people who have been for more than half a century controlled in most part by England. Among this number there are 67,000,000 Mohammedans, in some respects the most virile of the country. English rule has been benevolent, aiming at the development of the Indian people and their preparation for a measure of self-government. India's millions watched with profound interest the conflict between Russia and Japan, since they had been brought up to believe that the Asiatic races were naturally subject to the white races of the West. When Russia was defeated, India got a new conception of the possibility of independence for the Asiatic. She began to demand from England a larger measure of self-government and self-expression, which was freely granted. The present war, however, has carried India an enormous stride forward in self-consciousness and in her desire for home rule. She has furnished more than a million men to Great Britain to fight the war of the West for democracy. She was ready to furnish more men; but at the same time she has obtained a new conception of the possibilities that lie before India in the line of self-government. Demands have been made on Great Britain that a larger measure of home rule shall be given India, and these demands are receiving favorable consideration, and India will



soon be making her own laws and choosing those who shall execute them. India, which only fifty years ago seemed nationally helpless and incapable of self-government because of the lack of training and of dissensions among the various races making up her diverse population, is now uniting, the Hindu and the Mohammedan alike demanding that she have a share and a large share in the mighty democratic movement of the age. England has already promised India a large part at least of that for which she is asking.

We will not refer again to Russia, with its 180,000,000 already broken away from its autocratic government and old traditions and feeling its way blindly toward some form of self-government that shall recognize the rights of the people and grant them power of self-expression.

We will not prolong the list, but there are other smaller peoples moving in the same direction and countries that retain their monarch but shorn largely of power to rule because of the insistence of the people themselves upon a larger measure of self-rule. We have here named four countries which possess about two-thirds of the entire population of this world, all of which, within the last decade, have moved with startling rapidity away from an autocratic government into a form of democracy. If the movement of all these peoples is actuated by the proper ideals and the laws that they make are based upon the principles of justice, righteousness, and brotherhood, the world will move on speedily and steadily toward that happy day when nations shall dwell together in unity. But what will be the result to the world if these thousand million of the world's population or any important portion of them should come into a democratic form of government with ideals which will be a menace not only to their own populations but a curse to the rest of the world? Under such conditions we can turn only to the God of nations and devoutly call upon Him to have mercy

upon the world gone wrong and headed for self-destruction. It is fundamentally imperative, therefore, that these nations moving toward democracy should be inspired with ideals which will guarantee safety for themselves, their people, their immediate neighbors, and for the remoter nations that must deal with them in international relations.

What safeguard, therefore, can be thrown about this mighty, almost universal, democratic movement, so as to turn a possible curse into the greatest of blessings? There will always remain the influence which goes out from the Christian method of dealing with Eastern races, but such influences must necessarily be limited. The Christian merchant from the West can exert a strong, helpful influence upon these people of the East, but this influence is hampered by the fact that he goes to the East for personal gain. There are those who claim that education will make these nations safe; that if Japan, China, India, and Russia will only adopt modern education, build up great colleges and universities, put a high premium upon modern scholarship, introduce all the modern sciences, teach history and all that goes with it, this will make these coming Eastern democratic countries safe for the world. There is no denying the fact that a modern education has the greatest value, which cannot be overlooked when we consider those forces that must be brought to bear upon the East in this critical period of their history. At the same time we cannot forget, and must not, that Germany at the outbreak of this great war was called the best-educated nation on the face of the earth. Neither can we escape from the fact that because of her education in every department of science and history, Germany's menace to the world has been vastly greater than it otherwise would have been. Education has not saved Germany from bringing upon the world the greatest war of history accompanied by atro-

cities surpassing those perpetrated by the worst African tribes or the savages of the South Seas, forcing the world to make the greatest sacrifice ever made in any equal period of the world's history. Modern education without those ideals that must lie at the base of a safe and just and righteous government as taught by Jesus and his apostles and handed down through the universal Church from age to age, can never make safe a nation or a democracy.

We come then to the inevitable conclusion that it is only the living Church of Christ, reaching out into these great countries of the East through its multiform missionary agencies and establishing there Christian institutions of every character and grade, that we can implant in the hearts of their leaders who make the laws, shape the government, and establish international relationships, those principles of righteousness which will make them a blessing and not a curse to the world. This is putting upon the Church and the great missionary cause a stupendous and overwhelming responsibility, and yet it is one that they cannot evade. It is a responsibility that never was dreamed of a generation ago, but one that now with all its force thrusts itself to the front. To meet this responsibility the Church at home must rally its forces to the last man and the last woman and its resources to the last dollar that it may fulfil its sacred and world-embracing mission. This conflict is now ended, with the one mighty menace to human liberty crushed, and now the Church must take up its task, greater and more enduring even than the one for which the Allies fought, namely, to make, through the power of the universal gospel committed to it, the emerging democracies of the nations safe for themselves and for the world.

This is the task of the Church revealed to it by this war. The fact that foreign missions are the only agencies through which the Church can influence the ideals, ambi-



tions, thought, and life of the great nations and coming races of Africa and the East for justice, righteousness, and fraternity, removes them from the inferior position in which they have hitherto been classed, and gives them a place among the most important world-shaping agencies. The most potent energy today operating for international fraternity and world peace is the force that acts through modern foreign missions.

CHRISTIANITY AND DEMOCRACY<sup>1</sup>

ARTHUR CUSHMAN MCGIFFERT

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, NEW YORK

Whatever the outcome of the war, it has already rendered the world an immense service in defining with unexampled clearness and on a hitherto unmatched scale an ethical issue of the profoundest and most far-reaching significance. I do not mean the old issue raised by every war since the time of Christ—whether war is ever right and to engage in it ever Christian. That question is largely academic and in existing circumstances of altogether minor importance. In a situation like the present, Christian men as well as other men will fight, and fight with a good conscience, whatever may be said as to the abstract right or wrong of war, or as to its consonance with Christian principles. It would be easy to show that to identify Christianity with pacifism, as many devout and eager Christians are doing, is profoundly to misinterpret it and to lose sight altogether of its great controlling principles. But I am concerned this morning with another matter altogether—the fundamental moral issue raised by this particular war and Christianity's relation to that issue. I refer—to put it in a single phrase—to the issue between autocracy and democracy.

It is a mistake to regard this as a political issue merely, an issue with which Christianity has nothing to do. It is easy to regard it thus, for during the past fifteen hundred years Christian governments have been more

<sup>1</sup>Address given at the annual Commencement of Andover Theological Seminary, June 11, 1918.

frequently autocratic than democratic, and devout Christians have not only lived as contentedly in autocratic as in democratic states, but have even ruled with as good a conscience in the one as in the other.

But the events of the past four years have abundantly shown that the traditional neutrality of Christians and the Christian Church has been misplaced, that the issue between autocracy and democracy is a moral, not only a political issue, and that Christianity is profoundly concerned in it, as it is in all moral issues. The transfer of the age-long struggle between autocracy and democracy from the field of politics to the field of morals is, I take it, the most significant consequence of these four years of war.

The war did not begin as a contest between autocracy and democracy, any more than our Civil War began as a struggle over slavery. But as the Emancipation Proclamation made explicit an issue that had been involved from the outset, so the course of recent events, interpreted for the world at large by President Wilson, has made explicit an issue that was really already there, and has changed the war from a mere conflict between nations to a conflict between ideas. The South always insisted that the question of slavery was an economic, not a moral question, but the conscience of the North read it in moral terms and the North's victory put it permanently into the moral realm. We may in the past have believed that the question between autocracy and democracy is exclusively political, but it has now become to us and to our allies a moral question, and its moral character will not be again forgotten.

The recognition of the moral character of the issue between autocracy and democracy is due in no small part to Germany's unscrupulousness in the choice of means for the attainment of her ends. It is a profound remark that "the end does not justify the means but



is judged by the means." What autocracy is has been borne in upon the consciousness of the world by Germany's flouting of all moral considerations in her conduct of the war. The end must be unholy for which such means seem fit.

Brought under the inspection of the moral sense of the world at large, as it has not been before, autocracy, we are everywhere coming to see, like its twin sister imperialism, is not accidentally but essentially immoral, immoral not simply when it commits atrocities such as Germany has been committing, but immoral even when on its best behavior. The basis of all morality is mutuality. Autocracy is fundamentally evil because it denies to others rights and responsibilities which it arrogates to itself. Its motive may be wholly bad — the mere selfish and brutal will to power — or its motive may conceivably be good. The autocrat may interest himself in the welfare and happiness of those he rules and may believe them happier because he rules them. But the viciousness of autocracy is not thereby relieved. Whether exercised for good or evil ends it violates the cardinal principle of morality: it treats men as machines instead of persons, as things to be manipulated and controlled instead of free beings gifted with the privilege of choosing for themselves even to their own hurt. However much the autocrat may protest his consideration for his subjects, and his desire for their welfare, his attitude toward them is profoundly cynical.

With disregard for the rights of others is naturally associated contempt for their opinions and principles, and it is no accident that autocratic Germany in the present war shows scant respect for the moral judgments of the world at large. It is not Germany but autocracy that is betraying its true character in acting thus.

The subject upon which I wish to speak today is Christianity and Democracy. From the Christian point

of view the cardinal vice of autocracy is its denial of genuine human brotherhood — of the kinship and equality and liberty that brotherhood involves. To enslave another man is as unchristian as to destroy him. To count him an underling is as unchristian as to count him an enemy. This we have not always realized; under the stress of the present crisis we are beginning to realize it now.

Christianity began with a marked emphasis on love for others, and throughout Christian history love has remained a fundamental Christian virtue. To be sure its range was early narrowed, and love for the brethren usurped the place of love for all men. It was also crowded into a subordinate place by the growing emphasis on purity and unworldliness, so that in course of time the ideal Christian came to be the uncompromising ascetic rather than the loving and helpful neighbor and friend. But even so love remained a cardinal virtue and ever and anon its preëminence was reasserted. We live in an age when it has established itself as the supreme expression of Christian character, when to treat all men as brothers is recognized as the Christian's chief duty.

But unfortunately an essential element in brotherhood has been commonly overlooked. The love for which the early Christians stood was love between equals, not between superiors and inferiors. This explains in part the confinement of Christian love to the Christian brethren. They were on an equality of privilege and responsibility not shared by others and not affected by differences in worldly rank and possessions. As the circle of Christian brotherhood widened with the nominal conversion of the Roman world, this notion of Christian brotherhood, equalizing all the inequalities of life, became more and more of a fiction. To show a man Christian love now too often meant to assume not an essential equality between him and you but an essential inequality, enabling

you to exercise the congenial and condescending virtue of charity. Charity indeed came to seem peculiarly Christian just because of the lack of mutuality in it. On such a basis, of course, so long as it is benevolent, despotism is as Christian as democracy. Indeed, the benevolent despot, like the benevolent millionaire, has a larger and more splendid opportunity for Christian service than the ordinary man.

You recognize in this an attitude still common in democratic America as well as in autocratic Germany. Where it prevails, the Christian character of political as well as of economic autocracy passes unquestioned. So long as the Kaiser treats his people benevolently and gives them a good government, he is acting the part of a Christian prince, is acting all the more Christianly because he is doing it of his own free will and not under the compulsion of a constitution. So long as a powerful State controls and governs a weaker people in such a way as to insure their comfort and promote their prosperity, it is acting the part of a Christian State even though it has never secured the consent of the governed. Similarly, so long as an employer is kind to his employees — building model cottages, providing free lunches, giving frequent bonuses, and the like — he is acting the part of a Christian employer, even though he joins with others of his class in perpetuating the bondage of the wage-earner and in hindering the growth of economic freedom.

In modern times there has been a dawning suspicion that this attitude is immoral. But the suspicion has been hitherto confined largely to social radicals and reformers. Only now with the new emphasis on democracy and the growing apprehension of its meaning has the suspicion begun to penetrate the mind of the world at large, including the Christian Church. There is in it the promise of a revolution, social as well as political, of unexampled magnitude.



It is the barbarity and ruthlessness of Germany that has shocked the moral sentiment of the world and the Church, but the shock is awakening us to a realization of the essential evil of all autocracy and imperialism, economic as well as political, benevolent as well as cruel. It is not surprising that public opinion everywhere outside Germany has instinctively revolted against Bernhardi's brutal declaration that "the notion that a weak nation has the same right to live as a powerful nation is a presumptuous encroachment on the natural law of development." The significant thing is that the same public opinion is revolting not merely against the anti-Christian principle that the stronger nation has a right to crush the weaker, but against the farther principle, whose anti-Christian character has not hitherto been realized, that the stronger nation has the right to control the weaker. In other days, so long as the control was based, or claimed to be based, upon regard for the weaker nation's good, we commonly assumed, in our blindness, that whatever might be thought of it politically it was at any rate consonant with Christian principles and to be tolerated by the Christian Church. But now public opinion in all the countries of the Entente is going further even than the most sensitive Christian conscience formerly went, and is refusing to be satisfied with anything less than democracy within the nations and among the nations, with anything less than freedom and independence both for individuals and states. The political consequences of this steadily growing refusal we can begin faintly to imagine, the significance of it for Christian ethics we can already clearly see.

In other days the Church would have defined Christian brotherhood solely in terms of benevolence. Now the Church is learning to define it also in terms of democracy, is learning that it is not real brotherhood unless there be in it liberty as well as love. This is the great lesson of

the present war for Christianity. It did not need to be taught that the unselfish service of others is the very essence of Christian virtue. That it had long known, even though the practice of it might leave much to be desired. But the lesson of democracy it had never really learned, since it forgot it in the old days of Roman imperialism. It behooves it now so to learn the lesson that it may not be again forgotten. Christians must put an end to their old habit of dubbing all kindness Christian, and must refrain from giving that august name to anything that falls short of the full measure of the genuine Christian principle. They must demand that Christian brotherhood express itself in justice as well as in kindness, a justice that guards the rights and liberties of all men and nations, and assures to all the opportunity for self-expression, self-control, and a share in the duties and responsibilities of the whole human family. "Do ye unto others as ye would that others should do unto you," if it means anything at all, can mean no less than this.

Christian opinion usually follows the prevailing opinion of the world at large. Seldom, to its shame be it said, has the Church ventured upon new paths until common sentiment has pronounced them safe. In the present case we are witnessing the same phenomenon over again. Autocracy is falling under general condemnation and democracy is coming to seem alone righteous. Already there are signs that the Church too is awakening to the lesson of the hour and will soon pronounce unchristian what the world is already pronouncing immoral.

Among the cherished privileges rendered dubious by genuine democracy is the right of an individual or of a nation to count itself peculiarly called to the service of others. Once we should have recognized this without question as admirable and eminently Christian. But Germany's attitude has given us pause. Whether or not

they truly represent her, at any rate many of her writers have pictured her in the present struggle as obeying a divine call to serve the world by imposing her culture upon others less favored than herself. Her superior gifts and endowments, they claim, lay upon her the duty of spreading by any means her higher civilization far beyond her own borders. We are reminded in this of the attitude of many another nation, including our own, toward one and another primitive people. There is much in such an attitude that is praiseworthy, but as exhibited today by Germany it is exciting universal execration. It is not simply the conceit of it that offends the rest of the world, nor even altogether the violence of the means employed, but the violation of the very fundamentals of human intercourse — respect for others and regard for the integrity of their persons and ideals. Again Germany is teaching us all a lesson and pointing a warning. We are beginning to realize that the conquest of the world for the world's good is as unrighteous as the conquest of the world for the world's destruction.

The whole notion of chosen nations is beginning to be looked upon with suspicion. We long ago repudiated the old doctrine of election to special privilege, but we have widely cherished in its place the doctrine of election to special service. But this too, we are now discovering, may encroach dangerously upon democracy and human brotherhood. The danger lies not in assuming a call to service, but such a call as violates the independence of others and puts them beneath us. Even the good of the world is bought too dear at such a price. Democracy is consistent only with the recognition of a universal call. Every man and every nation have their place in the brotherhood of man and in the commonwealth of nations. All are called to serve, each in his own way, and like the several gifts described by the apostle Paul in the twelfth chapter of I Corinthians,



each is essential to the perfection of the whole and is to be held in honor by all.

What I have just been saying inevitably raises the question as to the bearing of all this on education. Does not education mean that we are called to serve the young and immature by imposing upon them the convictions and ideals that are the fruit of our greater experience and wisdom? To state the question is to answer it. Democracy in education means not to impose upon others what we have and to make of them what we are, but so to influence them that they shall work out their own salvation, creating their own characters and developing their own convictions and ideals in the light of the achievements of the race. Not only to give them a knowledge of the past and the present, but also to inspire in them a personality which shall make them masters of that knowledge, not its slaves — this is the duty and the privilege of the wise teacher. Such an attitude — and it is the deliberate attitude of all modern educators — is consistent with the most thoroughgoing democracy; any other attitude consorts only with autocracy.

And may not the same be said of the great work of foreign missions? Too often in the past it has been carried on in a spirit of presumption and bigotry that has elicited in heathen peoples a condemnation and contempt like that we feel for Germany today. But fortunately we are learning the lesson of democracy here as everywhere else. We are growing more becomingly modest and more broadly sympathetic. We are discovering that we can learn from non-christian peoples as well as they from us, that if we are called to serve them, they are called to serve us, and we are realizing that the ideal is not that they shall submissively accept from us what we have to offer, but that they and we together shall work out in the light of our common experiences

something better, something more profoundly and largely human, and — may I not say? — more profoundly and largely Christian, than anything we have hitherto known.

Christianity, as I have said, is learning a lesson from democracy. But it also has, in its turn, a lesson to teach democracy. Democracy means liberty, but liberty is dangerous unless it be permeated with the spirit of service. We have become accustomed, particularly in America, to think of liberty as a good in itself. But whether it be good or bad depends upon the use to which it is put. Liberty is opportunity, and opportunity ill employed is but the fruitful source of evil. Democracy may well be worse in its results than autocracy, if it mean only liberty for universal selfishness. Often indeed it is unlovely enough — quarrelsome, divisive, jealous of other's gifts, eager to get instead of to give, to exploit instead of to serve. If this were what democracy necessarily meant, we might well prefer autocracy. But democracy means this only if its dominating spirit be the spirit of selfishness, and this of all things it dare not be.

Autocracy and selfishness naturally belong together. Democracy requires a soul of another sort. It may well be that democracy, like autocracy, has ordinarily been born of self-interest; that it has sprung commonly from nothing higher than men's desire to protect themselves against the encroachments of their fellows. But a selfish democracy is in a constant state of unstable equilibrium. If every one is thinking only of his own weal, as soon as he grows strong he will instinctively seek to establish himself at the expense of others, and in a society where strong men abound, while the forms of democracy may continue to be observed, its spirit is certain to be progressively violated. We call ourselves a democratic nation, but we are well aware that even here in America democracy is sorely limited. Within the borders of this

commonwealth of ours flourish all sorts of autocracies born of selfishness and greed.

It is this kind of thing that has led many to advocate, in the interest of democracy, the desperate expedient of an enforced equality of fortune and of status for everybody. Strong men are not to be allowed to exercise their strength, because they thereby imperil the rights and encroach upon the privileges of others. Society must be levelled down to the poorest and most inefficient. Much of our modern social radicalism takes this position, and because of it democracy is discredited in many quarters. If this be what democracy means, we may well doubt whether human progress lies along the democratic path. But this is not what democracy means. Its watchword is not bare equality but liberty, and liberty makes room for the largest variety. The classic picture of an ideal democracy is drawn in the twelfth chapter of I Corinthians, to which I have already referred: "There are diversities of gifts, but the same spirit." I should like to quote the whole of the chapter, it is so full of suggestion for the theme I am dealing with. Variety of gifts, but respect for others than one's own; the higher and the lower, the greater and the less, yet all alike honorable; "that there may be no schism in the body, but that the members may have the same care one for another." To distrust democracy and to fancy that it is to be preserved only by enforced and deadening equality is to adopt a counsel of despair. Much better it is to render it secure by endowing it with a spirit congenial to its nature, the spirit of genuine brotherhood.

Democracy is voluntary and depends on mutual goodwill. In the last resort autocracy maintains itself, whether or no, by the power of coercion. But democracy has no such refuge. Its tendency is centrifugal. It lacks the external cohesion of autocracy, and, unless



it be held together by the inner bond of regard for others' good, it is bound to go to pieces.

Is it not then doomed, and are not they right who claim that autocracy is the only permanently practicable form of society? It is well that we should face this issue squarely. We are in the habit of saying that democracy demands intelligence, that it does not work well among immature and ignorant peoples. But we have failed to see that it demands also unselfishness. If it be true that it is impossible to make men unselfish, just as if it be true that it is impossible to make them intelligent, we may as well admit at once that democracy is a failure.

But it is not true. Far from perfect as the world is, it is everywhere blest both under autocracy and under democracy with those who live for others' good as well as for their own. In them is the real hope of democracy. Democracy need not wait until all men are unselfish, any more than public order must wait until all men are orderly. If every one were dishonest and murderous, there could be no public order, but the mass of men being what they are, it is easy to exercise control over the few that need it. Democracy is safe, even though it be not perfect, so long as there is enough unselfishness in it to counteract the disintegrating forces of mere self-interest.

To promote the spirit of unselfishness — this is the specific duty of Christianity, and thus it is that Christianity is called to serve democracy. To Christianize it through and through, to make it human instead of mechanical, to put love and sympathy and the desire to serve in place of indifference and jealousy and greed of personal gain and power. This is Christianity's great duty to the democracy of today and tomorrow. A genuine Christian democracy will emphasize duties and responsibilities rather than rights, what a man owes rather than what is owed him, what he can give rather than what he can get. It will mean interdependence

rather than independence and coöperation rather than competition.

Democracy is often criticised as inefficient. Of course it is inefficient if it means each man for himself. This is complete atomism, and atomism can accomplish nothing. Control is far more efficient, for it enforces unity of purpose and of plan, without which little is ever done. But a genuinely coöperative democracy is the most efficient form of society conceivable. For real coöperation there is room only where there is liberty. Free coöperation for a common end — there is no other power so mighty as this.

But again is this possible? That is the great question for democracy. If it be not, it is well for us clearly to recognize that in the long run there is nothing for the world but autocracy. The more clearly and the more widely this is recognized, the more likely we are to develop the only kind of democracy that can endure. Whether we can compass it, time alone will show. At any rate it is the only state of society worthy to be called the Kingdom of God on earth and the only one worthy to be made the object of Christian faith and effort.

To democratize Christianity and to Christianize democracy — this is the twofold duty facing Christians of today and tomorrow. Of all their duties none is more imperative and more pressing.

I have been speaking only of the ethical problems involved in Christianity and democracy; but it is natural in this place and on an occasion like the present to think also of the theological problems involved. I can speak of only one: What does the reading of Christianity in terms of democracy and of democracy in terms of Christianity mean for our interpretation of God?

It is evident, if we are to have a God consonant with the ethical ideal I have been insisting on — and this we must have or religion will be in lamentable case in these

days of a growing democracy — the two elements, liberty and service, must both be rooted in His character and play their part in His purpose for the world. Our God must not be an irresponsible autocrat to whom men are but puppets and for whose glory they exist. He must be a God to whom their persons are sacred and their liberties too precious to be invaded. Not to dominate and coerce them must be His desire, or to subject them to His omnipotent will, but to lead them into the full liberty of sons of God and to elicit in them that spirit of mutual sympathy and service that shall make of human society a genuine brotherhood. Worship and sacrifice must be less to Him than a free community of purpose and of effort for promoting this supreme end. He must permit us to share with him in the responsibility and in the dignity of the common task. Without the coöperation of men, if He be the God men need, His holy purposes must go unachieved and His holy will remain frustrated. Benevolent, of course, He must be, but benevolent despotism becomes God no more than man. He must be a God who counts it more to serve than to rule. Service of others we count the highest expression of goodness, and we cannot be content with anything less good in God. It is a sound instinct that has led men to recognize Christ as divine, divine not because of his power but because of his love, not because of his resurrection, but because of his death. If we are to believe in God at all, it must be in a God like Christ.

The old Church-father, Tertullian, once said that he would rather have a bad God than a weak God. But to us power must be subordinate to character and have worth only as it ministers to it. If we seek power above character or independently of character in God, it is because we are philosophers instead of Christians; or if not that, it is because we desire God to do our work for us, or to guarantee its being done whether we and



others bear our part or not. Such an attitude befits only those whose trust is in autocracy and to whom democracy seems but a broken reed.

Above all we need a God who shall represent to us our highest ideals and through faith in whom their divineness may be assured, a God in worshipping whom we are at the summit of moral devotion and achievement, and in serving whom we best serve our fellows and contribute most efficiently to the building of a true Christian democracy here on earth. Our faith in God means at least two things: that the sacred object of our hope and prayer and effort is divine, and that being divine it will ultimately prevail. Not that God will make it prevail by the exercise of divine power. Rather that, being divine, it will increasingly gather to itself the devotion and the sacrifice of the worshippers of God and the lovers of their brethren, and will make them strong to conquer and achieve. Faith in God divorced from faith in man is no faith for the Christian of today. Not faith in God instead of faith in man, not faith in God because of our despair of man, but faith in God because we believe in man and are confident that he will not be disobedient to the heavenly vision when once his eyes are opened to it.

## THE PEACE-MAKERS

FRANCIS GREENWOOD PEABODY

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

When the momentous news of an armistice in the world-war stirred vociferous multitudes to turbulent rejoicing, they were thrilled by the one overwhelming thought that peace at last had come. The war was at an end, and it must be the last of wars. A huge wave of grateful surprise surged up from the common level of national life and broke into a foam of high emotion. The thought of millions flashed across the sea by the wireless telegraphy of the spirit to those who on land and water and in the air had borne the part of America in the great adventure; and this message of thanksgiving could find no better words than the ancient Beatitude: "Blessed are the Peace-Makers, for they shall be called the children of God."

As the tumult and the shouting die, however, one is led to ask himself whether there was not something premature in this unmeasured self-congratulation. Was the war over when the fighting was done? Was the cessation of bloodshed, however longed-for and welcome, the assurance of an epoch of peace? Were there not enemies still left to meet, and battles to win, as threatening as on the plains of Flanders or the mountains of Italy? Should not one recall Milton's great words in his sonnet to Cromwell:

"Much remains

To conquer still; Peace hath her victories  
No less renowned than war; new foes arise,  
Threatening to bind our souls "?

No sooner was the armistice secure than it was succeeded by further and bewildering problems of national and international readjustment; and the sense of finality which had suddenly possessed the popular mind was succeeded by a sobering sense of continuity and comprehensiveness. The work of the Peace-Makers, instead of being completed, was seen to be just begun. The new issues which confronted the nations might be less tragic than the decisions of war, but they were likely to be far more subtle and beset by more insidious perils. The celebration of an armistice was indeed justifiably jubilant, and in millions of homes there was fervent thanksgiving that young men were to be no longer food for shrapnel and bombs; but this conclusion was after all only the beginning of a vast process of conciliation, and the festival was one of anticipation rather than of achievement, of hope rather than of peace.

When one turns with these chastening reflections to the Beatitude which sprang to one's lips as the message of the hour, he finds this larger and saner view of the problem of peace-making impressively anticipated. For who were these blessed, or happy, people who, according to the teaching of Jesus, should be called the children of God? They were not, it must be noticed, the Peace-Lovers, or the Peace-Talkers (*ἐιρηνικοί*); they were the Peace-Makers (*ἐιρηνοποιοί*), the constructive agents of tranquillity, the efficient contributors to security, the "mediators of peace" (Stier), or "they that work peace" (Alford). Here is quite another kind of blessing from that of peace itself. The Peace-Makers are not merely peaceable. They are not merely celebrating an armistice in war, but committed to a continuous and creative task. They are not rejoicing in the world as it is but rebuilding the world as it ought to be. They are not concerned with congratulation but with construction. That is what makes them "children of God," or gives them "the

rank of sons of God" (Moffatt). They are having a part in God's creative work. They are the people who, accepting the world as it is, with all its crudity, brutality, and even horror, propose to make a world which has the right to stay. It is a curious fact that the version of the Sermon on the Mount which each German child, under a militaristic system of religious education, must commit to memory, perpetuates a misinterpretation of the Beatitude. "Blessed," he repeats, "are the peaceable," or "those who are inclined to peace" ("Selig sind die Friedfertigen"); as though a sentiment were commended rather than a task enjoined; as though the blessing of Jesus might be claimed for pious declarations rather than reserved for creative actions. A leading commentator, himself a German, corrects the translation. "Not the Peace-Lovers," he says, "but the Peace-Builders, inherit the promise" ("Nicht die Friedfertigen, sondern die Friedestifter." Meyer).

In fact, when one proceeds from a single phrase of Jesus Christ to recall the dominating purpose of his ministry, it becomes evident that he was far less concerned with the maintenance of external peace than many of his followers and expositors have been inclined to infer. Peace is by no means a conspicuous word in the Synoptic Gospels. It is recorded indeed that the angels sang of peace on earth, but that blessing was conditional upon good-will among men. It is written again that the new teacher should "guide our feet into the way of peace," but that prediction was, first of all, of a way which must be followed before the end could be reached. The great words of the gospel are Righteousness, Love, Life. "Seek first the Kingdom of God and His Righteousness"; "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God and thy neighbor as thyself"; "I am come that they may have life." These were the antecedent conditions of peace. Given these, peace would follow; lacking these, peace



would be a mockery and sham. Peace, in a word, was not so much a cause to defend as a consequence to anticipate. It was not to be had for the asking or even for the praying; it had to be made; and that task of peace-making might involve struggle, delay, even defeat.

When one reviews still further the experience of Jesus himself it becomes evident that this creative task was his fundamental aim. For the obvious fact confronts us that Jesus never promised to his followers a world of unbroken peace, and that if he had done so his own experience would have refuted his teaching. Never was a career less peaceful than his, from the day when he fought with temptation in the wilderness to the day when he surrendered himself upon the cross. The Christ of the Gospels was not the non-combative, resigned, anæmic figure which Hebrew tradition and Christian art have conspired to create, but on the contrary the heroic, unflinching, sacrificial Master, whose word was with power and whose symbol of leadership was not a crown but a cross. The same Teacher of whom it was said, "The Lord of peace give you peace always by all means," said of himself, "Suppose ye that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you, Nay, but rather division"; and again, "I came not to send peace but a sword"; and yet again, "I am come to send fire on the earth."

Nor is this constructive doctrine an isolated teaching of the Sermon on the Mount. On the contrary, the same praise of peace, not as a cause but as a consequence, and the same summons to the creative task of peace-making, is heard both in the earlier Scripture and in the later books of the New Testament. "The work of righteousness," says the Prophet Isaiah, "shall be peace; and the effect of righteousness, quietness and assurance." Not peace first, that is to say, and as the effect of peace

a righteous world; but righteousness first and as the effect of righteousness — to be achieved as all effective righteousness has to be won, by victory over unrighteousness — a peace that is quiet and assured! “The righteous,” the same Prophet adds a little later, “. . . shall enter into peace.” Peace, in other words, is a quiet room of which righteousness holds the key. One turns the lock of duty, and enters by that door into peace. Not less impressive are the ancient condemnations of a way of life which reverses this moral chronology, and sets peace before righteousness. Such are they, the Prophet Jeremiah says, who are “given to covetousness . . . saying, Peace, peace, when there is no peace.” Such is the disappointment of those who have “sinned against the Lord . . . and looked for peace, but no good came.” “They shall seek peace,” says Ezekiel, “and there shall be none.” Such are “the prophets that make my people err, that bite with their teeth, and cry peace.” All these promoters of pacifism were engaged in fruitless enterprises, because they were crying for peace, or seeking peace, while tolerating covetousness, or sinning against the Lord, or biting with their teeth. The Prophet Isaiah sums up this doctrine of moral sequence: “There is no peace, saith my God, to the wicked.”

When one turns, on the other hand, from the Gospels to the Epistles of the New Testament, the same teaching of peace as the effect of righteousness is heard, like an echo of the Beatitude. “Peace,” the Apostle Paul writes, “will be rendered of God to every man that worketh good.” “Follow after the things that make for peace.” Peace, Paul says again, is the fruit of sacrifice. “Having made peace (*εἰρηνηποίησας*) through the blood of his cross.” “The fruit of righteousness,” says James, “is sown in peace of them that make peace.” It is, in other words, not primarily peace which is to be sought, but the things that make for peace, the goodness that

worketh peace, the peace that is the fruit of righteousness. The teaching of Jesus seems to have so wrought itself into the instincts of his followers that they habitually thought, not first of peace itself, but of the making of peace through the more arduous and aggressive process of making a better world. "We look," says the Epistle of Peter, "for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness. Wherefore, seeing that ye look for such things, be diligent that ye may be found of Him in peace." To look for peace might be to miss finding the new heavens and the new earth; but to look diligently for the things wherein dwelleth righteousness might be to be found of Him in peace.

Such then seems to be a consistent Biblical teaching, which finds its complete expression in the Beatitude of the Peace-Makers. A tranquillized and stable world is not to descend out of heaven like the New Jerusalem of the Book of Revelation; it must be built up out of the material of the world as it is on the foundation of personal and social righteousness. Peace, like happiness, is most likely to be reached when it is not directly sought. It is a by-product of conduct, a consequence of character. To secure it is not an achievement of armies or diplomatists alone. It is a comprehensive and continuous task of political reintegration, of social regeneration, and of moral restoration; and the blessing of Jesus is for those who, confronted by this vast problem of reconstruction, proceed to make out of a shattered world a social order which has the right to permanence.

Who then at such a time, are the Peace-Makers? Who are these sons of God, who, after this cyclonic desolation and unprecedented disaster, are laying the foundations of stability? They are, of course, first of all, those who have fought for a righteous cause. The first step toward rebuilding a world is to rid that world of treacherous foundations and toppling ambitions. The

ground must be cleared before the building can begin. The first task of the Peace-Maker in a just war is to bring that war to a just close. The historian Tacitus — himself a Roman — in describing the Roman conduct of war, puts into the mouth of the British Prince, Calgacus, this terrific indictment: "Plundering, butchery, pillaging, they call by the false name of world-power; and where they make a desert they call it peace" ("*Auferre, trucidare, rapere, falsis nominibus imperium, atque ubi solitudinem faciunt pacem appellant*" — Agricola, Ch. 30). The words might have been written of the German legions which on the same fair fields of Gaul made a desert while they talked of peace. From that illusion of peace by subjugation and terrorism the world is happily set free. The Peace-Makers must be, not those who make a desert, but those before whom the desert shall rejoice and blossom as the rose.

And that is what has made these fighting Peace-Makers happy. It is an extraordinary fact that through these long, hard years those who have been most deeply involved in the tragedy of the time have found themselves lifted into an unanticipated exhilaration and joy! "Happy are the Peace-Makers," says the Beatitude; and that consciousness of having even the humblest part in the making of a world fit to live in has given to millions of gallant youths, not only the power to endure, but a strange contentment and peace of mind. This is the wonderful note which we have heard in messages from the front. An American boy writes to his mother: "This is a dirty, nasty job. There are rats at my feet and shrapnel at my head; but I would not be anywhere else or doing anything else for all the world." An American aviator, dashed to the ground on two successive days, writes in his diary, "These last weeks are the first time I have ever lived." Happy indeed are they who have thus passed from boyishness, or aimlessness,



or selfishness, to the supreme discovery of a man's work to do for something far greater than himself; from the life of pleasure-makers, or dream-makers, to the life of Peace-Makers. Out of the fire of the time they have snatched their blessing. Theirs is the Beatitude of the Sons of God.

We hear it sometimes prophesied that the tension of war is likely to be succeeded by a period of moral laxity and social degeneration; and it has been intimated that this was the experience of the United States after the Civil War. But was the outcome of that fratricidal conflict, on the whole, one of national reaction and decline? Many instances no doubt there were of public scandal and private demoralization; but was not the *morale* of the country as a whole definitely quickened by the experience of war? Slavery no longer tolerated; specie-payments quickly restored; and an unprecedented expansion of philanthropy and public service — these results of the war between the States were not marks of national degeneration. Unscrupulous adventurers from the North, it is true, invaded the South after the war; but in far greater numbers and with vastly greater resources there marched southward another army of teachers and missionaries, to fortify the white race in their struggle for existence and to train the black race for citizenship. The same general effect is likely, we may hope, to be the outcome of the present crisis. It may indeed happen that the sudden release from discipline and the exhilaration of home-coming will, in many instances, involve loss of restraint. But is it not far more probable that the total effect of this vast and tragic experience — this real descent into Hell which these young men have made — will be a sobering and chastening of character and a lifting of their view and duty above the level on which they had before habitually lived? This, we may confidently believe, is to be one of the

great mitigations of the vast calamity — that it has given to millions of youths a new range of thought, a new vision of service, a new respect for discipline, a new consent to loyalty and sacrifice, which may be forthwith applied to the service and redemption of a waiting world. May it not happen indeed that these youths, bringing back with them their fresh maturity and solemn experience, will come as missionaries of a new social order to the belated stay-at-homes of an unchanged world? Happy indeed will be such Peace-Makers if they shall bring with them, not only the strength to fight and kill, but the not less needed strength to confirm our courage and to reconstruct our world! It is that happiness of a conscious coöperation with the Divine purpose which may give to each such young soldier the title of a son of God.

Next to the fighters in the great army of the Peace-Makers come the counsellors. The destroyers of a bad world prepare the way for the master-builders of a new world. And what a summons is here for sagacity, for integrity, for magnanimity! Never in human history was a Divine judgment so sternly visited on ambition, cruelty, and faithlessness; and never was such a need of wisdom and disinterestedness in those who sit in judgment. Convicted the guilty must be, but without rancor; punished, but without bitterness; controlled, but by those who are themselves self-controlled. Peace will not be made until these preliminaries of peace restore the hope of the stricken world. The end of war is not in sight until victory is crowned with the same generous desires which have inspired the free offering of treasure and blood. Happy will be those Peace-Makers who thus rebuild the framework of the world; and happy this favored nation if the great words of our Chief Magistrate shall be confirmed by the will of the people. "The present and all that it holds," said President Wilson, in

announcing to Congress the terms of armistice, "belongs to the nations and the peoples who preserve their self-control and the orderly processes of their governments; the future to those who prove themselves the true friends of mankind. To conquer with arms is to make only a temporary conquest; to conquer the world by earning its esteem is to make permanent conquest. I am confident that the nations that have learned the discipline of freedom and that have settled with self-possession to its ordered practice are now about to make conquest of the world by sheer power of example and of friendly helpfulness."

So far we seem likely to be brought on the way to peace-making. And yet, beyond all the achievements of armies and navies and statesmen, lie the momentous problems of personal and private life, awaiting in their unprecedented complexity the generous service of the Peace-Makers. Among the many grave uncertainties of the immediate future, one thing seems certain — that the world will be of a different kind from that in which we have thus far lived. The vast transformation of industrial life which we are already witnessing; the growth in power and self-respect of the wage-earning majority; the extension of governmental control beyond the most sanguine dreams of revolutionists, and with scarcely a murmur of dissent; the increasing indifference to those details of religious opinion which have created the sects, and at the same time the deepening sense of a Divine purpose in the world, and the emergence from terrific experiences of suffering and sacrifice of a simplified religious faith — all these undisputable signs of the time point to a new era which calls for a new habit of mind and a new spirit of service. "There is no question," the Bishop of Oxford has lately said, "that the whole of our conception of civilization, the fabric of our civilization — national, international, commercial, and to a very

large extent religious, and almost more than all educational — had been built up on a basis of selfishness; and it has collapsed" (*The Hope for Society*, 1918, p. 16). But suppose that this new world were to be met by the old habit and spirit — of industrial contention, of partisan politics, of sectarian religion! What kind of peace would ensue? Would there not be another war to fight, perhaps more disastrous and prolonged than that from which we are just emerging? Is not the fearful Nemesis of anarchy which Russia and Germany are at this moment enduring, the inevitable reaction from autocratic control; and does it not have its solemn lessons for those nations which are now celebrating peace? When the Devil of the battlefield is cast out, may not seven other evil spirits invade an unprepared and complacent world — the devils of rapacious capital, of unscrupulous labor, of class conflict, of political partisanship, of social laxity, and of religious intolerance, and the last state of civilization be worse than the first? "The future of mankind," John Stuart Mill once said, "will be gravely imperilled if great questions are left to be fought out between ignorant change and ignorant opposition to change." What a call is here to the Peace-Makers, in their own vocations and within the circle of their own capacity, to establish on the ruins of an earlier world a social order which has the right to permanence!

Here, for example, are the threatening conditions of our industrial life, which have in them the possibilities of a war, more embittered, prolonged, and destructive than even the present conflict. What shall prevent that clash of interests which threatens to divide the forces of production into implacable foes? Peace in industry is not to be suddenly attained. It has to be made — through prolonged negotiation, through patient experimentation, through fraternal coöperation. Nothing in business affairs is more depressing today than to see an



employer or a corporation taken by surprise when industrial war is suddenly declared, and proposing to meet it by a patched-up, improvised, or insincere peace. It is as when in ancient Israel men were "given to covetousness, saying 'Peace, peace,' when there is no peace." And nothing, on the other hand, is more reassuring than any well-considered, forward-looking, declaration of principles—be it of a Labor Party or an employing corporation—any step, however hesitatingly taken, undisguised in intention and based on mutual confidence, in which peace is to be the effect of righteousness, a consequence of the things which make for peace. Such is the new opportunity offered to the Peace-Makers of the industrial world; and as they work out with discernment and good faith the Divine purpose for the future, they have won their right to the title of the sons of God. "The political mind," a discerning student of the times has recently said, "the legal mind, the historical mind, the religious mind—each will have its own contribution to make to the problem before us—that of diverting the life of nations from the path of strife to the path of coöperation. But in addition to these we shall need another and perhaps greater contribution from the trained *business mind* of the community. . . . To industry will fall the task of restoring prosperity to a well-nigh ruined world. May we not say, therefore, that it holds the key to the problem?" (L. P. Jacks. *Hibbert Journal*. October, 1918. P. 38.)

Nor is the war of industry the only field of operation for the Peace-Makers. Each undertaking which may secure a healthier or a happier world; each judicious campaign against disease, idleness, crime, or drink; each constructive enterprise for sanitation, education, or recreation; each step in the conservation of those men or women of tomorrow who are children today; each comprehensive movement of religious fellowship, caring less

for conformity than for consecration, less for the salvation of one's self than for the sanctifying of one's self for others' sakes — each such task of foresight and insight, undertaken without delay, has its place in the great work of peace-making. And here again is the reason why these self-effacing lives, concerned with all these varied forms of social service, are finding themselves, not only very busy, but, in a new and unanticipated way, happy in their work. They have come to understand the paradox of Christianity. They have found themselves in losing themselves. They are working righteousness and finding peace. They are learning the meaning of the Beatitude, "Happy are the Peace-Makers."

There remains, however, one further aspect of this law of peace-making which brings us still nearer to the heart of Christ. For after all has been said of peace as something to be made, it still remains true that not every one, even with the most eager desire, is qualified to be a Peace-Maker. A nation, as we are forced at this moment to recognize, cannot be a trusted instrument of peace so long as in its national character it does not seek the things which make for peace. A government which has tolerated piracy, poison, and plunder, and has broken with equal indifference the laws of God and man, cannot without repentance and delay, claim the blessing of the Peace-Makers. Its aims must inevitably be scrutinized and its motives suspected. Its Peace Offensive will seem likely to lead to an offensive peace. The only nation which can make peace is one whose hands are clean and whose motives are pure. Righteousness not only, as the Book of Proverbs says, "exalteth a people," but it alone gives to that people the right to become Peace-Makers.

All this which at this very moment is proving so true of nations is not less true of individuals. Only he can

give who has. Only he can lend a hand who has an honest hand to lend. Only he can control others who has self-control. The reason why Jesus Christ has become to the world a messenger of peace is not that his life was peaceful, but that through the stormy vicissitudes of his sacrificial career he possessed that peace which he promised to bestow. "My peace I give unto you," he said, but in the same sentence added, "In the world ye shall have tribulation." It was not peace of circumstances which he offered, but peace of mind. The control of circumstances through antecedent self-control made his life, though one of continuous conflict, seem to his followers the life of a Prince of Peace. He did not have peace — he made it; and that making of peace through suffering made him, as the Beatitude says, the Son of God.

It must be the same with the Peace-Makers of the modern world. Not every employer can establish peace with his wage-earners. They are quick with suspicion, sensitive to affront, conscious of power. Confidence cannot be suddenly grafted on a stock of distrust. Industrial peace must be a growth, not a makeshift. It is the effect of righteousness, the gradually ripening fruit of frater-nalism. The primary obstruction to industrial peace is not created by the inevitable conditions of the world of trade, but by misunderstandings, distrust, greed, stupidity. If an embittered class-conflict in industry is not to follow the war of nations, the Peace-Makers of the business world — both employers and employed — must not only lay their plans, but also search their own hearts, without delay. It is the same with the social service of the time. Not everyone who wants to help the poor or save the children or lift the fallen, can have the blessedness of efficiency. Leadership is the corollary of life. "When he putteth forth his sheep," it was written of Jesus, "he goeth before, and the sheep follow, for they

know his voice." A genuine and sympathetic life does not have to drive; it *draws*. The sheep know the tone of the voice, and follow. The Peace-Possessor becomes the Peace-Maker.

It is the same with the reconstruction of religion which now awaits the world. We talk much of the Christian unity which is to supplant the lamentable divisions of the Church; and movements and combinations multiply to indicate that the theological Peace-Makers are at work. It must not be forgotten, however, that these well-intentioned enterprises will succeed, not through the nice adjustment of conflicting claims, or the surrender of some truth for the sake of more peace, but through the deliverance of minds from small issues and the recognition of the simplicity which is in Christ. If in these deliberations any taint is perceptible of ecclesiastical ambition, or self-interested diplomacy, or denominational profiteering; if, as in international affairs, the rights of small Powers are ignored and the good of the world identified with the expansion of a single authority, then the end must be like a Prussian victory — not peace, but an armed truce; not unity, but revolution. The ecclesiastics may make a desert and call it peace. The Peace-Makers of the Christian Church, like the heirs of the same promise in politics and trade and social service, must be first of all obedient to the heavenly vision of a comprehensive and fraternal faith.

It is, then, with a certain sense of surprise that one is led back — even in these days which seem so absorbed in external events — to the undiminished authority of the life within. The chief difficulty in making peace with the Teutonic Powers is simply that we cannot trust them. The chief hindrance of peace in industry is simply the sense of wrong. The chief limitation of social service is in proposing to accomplish by machinery what can be done only by life. The first obstruction to religious



unity is in the undertaking of a great task by small people. Blessed indeed are the Peace-Makers, but they cannot be those whose motives are improvised or self-interested or half-hearted. The rank of the Sons of God is reserved for those who have something of the perseverance and wisdom of God. "The wisdom that is from above," said the Apostle James, "is first pure, then peaceable." Not peaceableness first, but purity; not safety first, but service; not an untroubled world, but an unclouded heart — that is the spiritual chronology of a Christian experience. It may not have been an accident that the Beatitude of the Pure in Heart immediately precedes the Beatitude of the Peace-Makers. The pure in heart, it is written, "see God," even amid the tragedies of war and the not less solemn problems of reconstruction; and that capacity for vision of the Eternal Purpose qualifies them for the further title of Sons of God, which is bestowed upon the Peace-Makers.

## SEEKERS AFTER GOD

DURANT DRAKE

VASSAR COLLEGE

"In evil times men turn their minds more anxiously to religion." Thus wrote that hearty atheist, Lucretius, amidst the alarums of those far-off, uneasy, Roman days. Equally true is the saying of the still more desperate years through which the world has lately been passing. Even before the torrent of war broke, in the confused and restless prelude of the opening century, many hands were outstretched, many hearts yearning for a new vision of God. For God, or for something to take His place, something to give an ultimate meaning to life, an ideal dimension, an underglow of purpose and a deep tide of peace —

"Round our restlessness His rest."

This noteworthy revival of the search for God sharply differentiates itself from the apologetics and exhortations that preceded it during generations of a regnant Christian tradition. Formerly the concept "God" was taken to be clear and definite enough, and the search was for proofs of His existence. Such a book as Clarke's *The Christian Conception of God*, with its complacent elaboration of God's attributes, could regard as obvious heresies the conceptions that are now most astir in the world, and devote the bulk of its five hundred pages to the various lines of supposed proof that the God of orthodox dogma, with His omniscience, omnipotence, aseity, and what not, exists. Now, however, the vast theological library which this volume illustrates (rather more readably than the ruck of them) is, for progressive

thinkers, simply shelved. The question has become, not, Can we believe in this cut-and-dried conception of mediæval and modern orthodoxy, but rather, Is there *any* conception of God that we can accept? In other words, the God-idea has become fluid again, the God of the future is in the making. And this emancipation from the fixity of the conception that had become traditional has led many thinkers who would never have concerned themselves seriously with the God of popular belief, to look afresh at this, perhaps the greatest of human conceptions, and to seek to mould it into a form more consonant with man's maturer experience and more serviceable for his spiritual life.

Matthew Arnold is perhaps as much as any one to be thanked for this unprecedented plasticity of the God idea. With untiring reiteration and serene patience under a storm of abuse, he protested against "our mechanical and materializing theology, with its insane license of affirmation about God . . . just as if he were a man in the next street!" In America, Emerson and, more lately, William James did a great deal to shake up inherited conceptions. The title of a recent volume, *The Enlarging Conception of God*,<sup>1</sup> is significant. But it is still true that "our conception of the universe has grown faster than our thought of God has grown."<sup>2</sup>

Matthew Arnold's definition of God as "the Power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness"—and for all good, as he parenthetically admits—was an attempt to rescue the God-idea from dogmatic theology and make it an empirical conception which the most convinced rationalist might accept—nay, must accept, because the Power, whatever its ultimate and inner nature, is incontestably here in the world. The Huxleys and the Cliffords, many of the leaders of thought in the

<sup>1</sup> H. A. Youtz, *The Enlarging Conception of God*. The Macmillan Co., 1914.

<sup>2</sup> W. H. P. Faunce, *What does Christianity Mean?* F. H. Revell Co., 1912.

Anglo-Saxon and Teutonic world, clinging to their intellectual integrity at whatever cost of odium and personal loss, were openly disavowing belief in God; while in Latin Europe the belief, outside of the Catholic Church, was already obsolescent. Is there less intellectual conscience in the twentieth century, less conviction of the truths of evolution and the presence of "law" in the world? On the contrary, these beliefs, then daring, have now become commonplaces. If there is less avowed atheism today (and certainly atheism is less blatant, if perhaps more widespread), it is because it seems now rather needless to be an atheist. There are so many conceptions of God afloat that any one at all widely read can scarcely fail to find one suited to his mental outlook and convictions.

Even among the socialist masses, generally taken to be atheistic, there is not so much denial of God as denial of the church-conceptions of God. Thus Mr. Blatchford, the editor of the London *Clarion*, in a book circulated widely among Socialists,<sup>3</sup> expresses in plain and vigorous words his disbelief in "the Bible God," in a personal God, in an omnipotent God, but does not say there is *no* sort of God. There is here none but a negative side to the modern movement; but one feels that the ejection of the "orthodox" conception leaves clear room for the preaching of the naturalistic God of contemporary thought. It would not be surprising if, under the impulse of post-bellum readjustment, such a God were to be espoused by some eloquent revivalist and accepted by millions of spiritually famished men and women who have left forever the old dogmas and (unless, indeed, it show greater signs of openness to the critical spirit than at present) the Christian Church.

The present writer conducted in 1912 a questionnaire among college graduates in this country, investigating

<sup>3</sup> Robert Blatchford, *God and My Neighbor*. Chicago, Chas. H. Kerr Co., 1911.



among other matters, their belief in God. The results<sup>4</sup> showed that of the several hundred who replied, some 34 per cent. believed firmly in "a personal God," 23 per cent. firmly disbelieved, and the rest were more or less uncertain. Slightly more than 50 per cent. were convinced of the omnipotence of God. But very few (about 1 per cent.) rejected the belief in God *in toto*. Professor Leuba's recent more elaborate investigation<sup>5</sup> gives, among many other interesting statistical results, the following: Among college *students* (*my* questionees were graduates of a dozen years' standing), 56 per cent. of the men believed in a personal God, and 82 per cent. of the women. Another part of the inquiry, addressed to American scientists, historians, etc., stated the belief about which this information was desired as follows: "I believe in a God to whom one may pray in the expectation of receiving an answer. By 'answer,' I do not mean the subjective, psychological effect of prayer." The men addressed were divided into those of lesser and those of greater eminence, using as a criterion the stars in *American Men of Science*. Of the men "of lesser eminence," 48 per cent. affirmed the above belief; of the men "of greater eminence," 32 per cent. Some special classes, sociologists and psychologists, show considerably less acceptance of the belief, the "greater" psychologists falling as low as 13.2 per cent.

What is noteworthy in these data is not merely the apparent waning of this particular conception of God as education and scientific training advance, but also the great number of addressees who went out of their way to explain that they did believe in *some* conception of God. With many the conception is very indefinite, with others it is fairly clear-cut; but with few is it purely traditional. It is this educated public that furnishes the readers of the rich literature dealing with God that

<sup>4</sup> See *The Independent*, vol. 75, p. 755.

<sup>5</sup> J. H. Leuba, *The Belief in God and Immortality*. Sherman, French, & Co., Boston, 1916.

has sprung up so thickly since the dawning of our present century.

For certain types of mind pantheism will doubtless always be alluring. Many of Emerson's utterances had a pantheistic ring, as when, standing on the summit of Greylock, he ejaculated: "God! It's all God!" His friend Carlyle was more thoroughly pantheistic — and not afraid of the term, as his reply to Sterling's accusation witnesses: "Pantheism! Pantheism! What does it matter, it's religion." Coming to our own day, the veteran and beloved John Burroughs equates the terms "God" and "Nature." "We must get rid of the great moral governor or head director. He is a fiction of our own brains. We must recognize only Nature, the All; call it God if we will, but divest it of all anthropological conceptions. . . . Here is this vast congeries of vital forces which we call Nature . . . the sum and synthesis of all powers and qualities, infinite and incomprehensible. This is all the God we can know, and this we cannot help but know." <sup>6</sup>

Similarly, ex-President Eliot, in his famous address on *The Religion of the Future*,<sup>7</sup> declares that "the new thought of God will be its most characteristic element." "The Infinite Spirit pervades the universe, just as the spirit of a man pervades his body, and acts, consciously or unconsciously, in every atom of it." It is "one omnipresent, eternal Energy, informing and inspiring the whole creation at every instant of time and throughout the infinite spaces." This neo-pantheism is widespread enough to induce one of our leading publishing houses to reprint Seeley's *Natural Religion*, a treatise once famous but lately out of print. This little book combines the most explicit frankness with literary charm

<sup>6</sup> John Burroughs, *The Light of Day*. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1901.

<sup>7</sup> Delivered at the Harvard Summer School of Theology, July 22, 1909, and subsequently printed in the *Atlantic Monthly* and in pamphlet form.

in an unusual degree, and remains perhaps the clearest popular exposition of the pantheistic conception.<sup>8</sup> Dr. Campbell's "new" theology seems to be of much the same type.<sup>9</sup>

It may be questioned whether the Absolute of the late Professor Royce should be regarded as a pantheistic conception, for the philosophic approach, highly technical and elaborate, gives it very different connotations. But certainly his Absolute was the One inclusive Reality, a Reality all-perfect, super-personal, transcending time and space, and certainly it gathered about itself the atmosphere of the Christian God. In his last great work,<sup>10</sup> Royce struck into rather a new vein, and defined God in a way far more in accord with the now dominant tendency, as "the spirit of the beloved community."

Professor Hocking, whose debt to this master is evident and acknowledged, declares that pantheism is, like all our human conceptions, too poor, too inadequate to the truth. With the fervor of a mystic, he describes God as One and Ineffable, union of all contradictions, ground of all reality. But for the non-philosophic mind, dazed by mysticism and metaphysics alike, such statements as "God is that which does whatever Substance is found to do"<sup>11</sup> will suffice to classify the writer, for practical purposes, with the pantheists; for this practical purpose, at least, that his God, being omnipotent and omnipresent, has to answer for the evil as well as the good in the world.

This is, of course, the insistent dissatisfaction with Absolutes and deifications of Nature. From the time of John Stuart Mill (to go no farther back), whose forcible essay on *Nature*, and whose sensational refusal to worship an omnipotent God even if he were to be damned

<sup>8</sup> Sir John R. Seeley, *Natural Religion*. The Macmillan Co., 1916.

<sup>9</sup> R. J. Campbell, *The New Theology*. The Macmillan Co., 1907.

<sup>10</sup> Josiah Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*. The Macmillan Co., 1913.

<sup>11</sup> W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*. Yale University Press, 1912.

therefor, paved the way for his rather hesitating belief in a limited God, to the present day, pantheisms of every stripe have had to meet objection not only from the orthodox, but, on the other side, from those whose horror of evil prevents their tolerating a God who includes (however he may "transcend") evil in his being or as his expression or creation.

Mill was an earnest seeker after God, and so was Richard Jefferies, whose *Story of My Heart*<sup>12</sup> is one of the most beautiful books in our language. To be sure, Jefferies passionately repudiates belief in God: "How can I adequately express my contempt for the assertion that all things occur for the best, for a wise and beneficent end, and are ordered by a humane intelligence! It is the most utter falsehood and a crime against the human race. . . . Human suffering is so great, so endless, so awful that I can hardly write of it." But this is clearly a denial merely of the omnipotence of God; while in Jefferies' constantly reiterated longing for "something higher than Deity," and indeed in the mysticism and "soul-thirst" which pervades the book, we see what most of us would call the search for a more tenable conception of God, certainly not at all a satisfied atheism. Mr. Hobhouse has recently phrased more calmly what Jefferies and many others have felt: "The moral indifference of nature forces itself upon us; and it becomes evident that the real as such is not spiritual nor the creation of anything that is purely spiritual, just, or good, in the human sense. The spiritual is an *element in Reality*."<sup>13</sup>

Christian orthodoxy has never been clear or consistent upon this point; it has striven to reconcile the comfortable conviction that

"God's in His heaven,  
All's right with the world,"

<sup>12</sup> Longmans, Green, & Co., ninth impression, 1906.

<sup>13</sup> L. T. Hobhouse, *Development and Purpose*. The Macmillan Co., 1913.



with the moral conviction that evil is evil and must, with God's help, be fought and cast out. The conception of Satan, taken over from the Persian religion, has prevented Christianity from becoming a clear-cut monotheism, as Mohammedanism has been; many Christian writings depict their God as a striving God, not unlike the Ahura-Mazda of Zoroaster, or the finite God of William James,<sup>14</sup> whose success is dependent in part upon our faithfulness.

Lately Mr. Wells has advertised this conception to an audience wider than James (in spite of the latter's enormously superior scholarship and brilliance of style) could reach. It is interesting to note that in an earlier book<sup>15</sup> he refrained from applying the term "God" to his conception, on the ground that "the run of people even nowadays mean something more and something different when they say 'God.'" In *Anticipations*<sup>16</sup> he had used the term freely, but with no positive definition, contenting himself "with denying the self-contradictory absurdities of an obstinately anthropomorphic theology, as, for example, that God is an omniscient mind. This is the last vestige of that barbaric theology which regarded God as a vigorous but uncertain old gentleman with a beard and an inordinate lust for praise and propitiation." At last, however, Mr. Wells has succeeded in formulating his conception of God, and has written, as we all know, a whole book to expound it.<sup>17</sup>

Mr. Wells is worth reading, in spite of defects of scholarship and occasional intemperance of language, because of his clearness and candor, his contagious enthusiasm and assurance, and because, as in so many other matters,

<sup>14</sup> William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Longmans, Green, & Co., 1902.

<sup>15</sup> H. G. Wells, *First and Last Things*. Harper & Brothers, 1908.

<sup>16</sup> Harper & Brothers, 1901.

<sup>17</sup> H. G. Wells, *God the Invisible King*. The Macmillan Co., 1917.

his mind is a faithful index of the movement of one of the main currents, perhaps *the* main current, of contemporary thought. It is easy to offer objections to his view, as the denominational papers have naturally done, and as, from the opposite, atheistic, point of view Mr. Archer so quickly and cleverly did.<sup>18</sup> But Mr. Wells will survive this cross-fire, and his vigorous little book is having a very considerable influence.

We find it here distinctly asserted that God is not the creator of the universe, but "comes, we know not whence, into the conflict of life. He works in men and through men. . . . He is the undying human memory, the increasing human will." This is reminiscent of earlier expressions by a scholarly American writer,<sup>19</sup> who had defined "God" as "our own ideal life," "the finer life that lives potentially in ourselves," "the deeper, more comprehensive self in all men that is urging to realization."

Is this Platonism? Is it the conception, so eloquently presented by T. H. Green,<sup>20</sup> of God as "our unrealized ideal of a Best," the name a symbol for that perfection which eludes us in earthly things, but which we must ever love and follow? Certainly we get the true Platonic note in Tagore's "When the soul seeks God she seeks her final escape from this incessant gathering and heaping and never coming to an end. It is not an additional object that she seeks, but it is the permanent in all that is impermanent, the highest abiding joy unifying all enjoyments."<sup>21</sup> We find it again in the writings of that master-preacher, Dr. George A. Gordon, who speaks of God as "the meaning, beauty, spirit, and power of our whole experience. . . . God as the perfect good or

<sup>18</sup> William Archer, *God and Mr. Wells*. New York, Knopf, 1917.

<sup>19</sup> H. A. Overstreet, *Hibbert Journal*, vol. 11, p. 394; vol. 13, p. 155, and *Forum*, vol. 52, p. 499 (1913 and 1914).

<sup>20</sup> T. H. Green, *The Witness of God*. Longmans, Green, & Co., 1897.

<sup>21</sup> Rabindranath Tagore, *Sadhana*. The Macmillan Co., 1913.

satisfaction moves the universe. . . . He moves the rational spirit of man through love of the highest, and thus draws the soul to Himself." And again, he speaks of "the good, that is only another name for God."<sup>22</sup> These are almost the words of Professor Bousset, who frankly declares that "the Christian belief regards God and moral good as one."<sup>23</sup>

Such utterances seem almost as unmistakable as Emerson's "I, the imperfect, adore my own perfect." God seems relegated to the realm of the ideal, which, though the one reality to Plato, is sharply contrasted with the real by contemporary philosophy and common sense. But after all, we must not press a single aspect of these writers' thought. Pantheism, Dualism, Platonism — these labels do injustice to the many-sidedness, the synthetic power — or is it a loose eclecticism? — of modern thought.

Christian theology has always been synthetic, as in the doctrine of the Trinity, which insists that God, although One, is *both* the Father *and* the Son *and* the Holy Ghost. Moreover, this ancient dogma, in spite of Biblical criticism and the spread of a rationalistic spirit, persists. It is worth asking whether, though a scrutiny of the historic causes that produced it scarcely recommends it to us, it be not, after all, based upon a threefold human experience.

God the Father is the Pantheist's God: "The word God is a symbol to designate the universe in its ideal-achieving capacity."<sup>24</sup> But for the average Christian, God the Son has been far more real. That is, he has found God not so much in the heavens that declare His glory, as in this spiritual leader whose name our Church bears. So Dr. Lyman Abbott, who writes to a wide

<sup>22</sup> George A. Gordon, *Aspects of the Infinite Mystery*. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916.

<sup>23</sup> W. Bousset, *The Faith of a Modern Protestant*. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913.

<sup>24</sup> G. B. Foster, *The Function of Religion in Man's Struggle for Existence*. University of Chicago Press, 1909.

audience and typifies the liberal spirit in the American Church, confesses that the old God of theology is an idol, and that its place has been taken for him "by the God who has been revealed to me in the earthly life and character of Jesus of Nazareth."<sup>25</sup> And a chapter dealing with Christ in one of Dean Hodges' recent books<sup>26</sup> bears the title, *The Supreme Disclosure of God*.

But it is God the Holy Spirit that is most ardently preached by the new prophets. Among them there is none who writes with more charm and tenderness than that intrepid soldier, Sir Francis Younghusband. The first leader of white men to penetrate into the forbidden city of Lhasa, he is now leader in the spiritual adventure. In two not very large volumes he gives us of his experience and his personality, and therewith much food for thought.<sup>27</sup> "We are realizing nowadays," he says, "that the old guardian God of our childhood never existed. . . . What then is to take his place? . . . We are abandoning the idea of God the Father, and we are realizing the idea of God the Holy Spirit. We are giving up the idea that the Kingdom of God is in Heaven, and we are finding that the Kingdom of God is *within* us. We are relinquishing the old idea of an external God, above, apart, and separate from ourselves; and we are taking on the new idea of an internal spirit working within us — a constraining, immanent influence, a vital, propelling impulse vibrating through us all, expressing itself and fulfilling its purpose through us, and uniting us together in one vast spiritual unity."

Now Mr. Wells, though a sort of super-democrat in his political thinking, and in spite of his recent hints that the British monarchy may have outgrown its usefulness, nevertheless speaks of God as King. Other

<sup>25</sup> The Outlook, vol. 117, p. 193 (1917).

<sup>26</sup> George Hodges, *Everyman's Religion*. The Macmillan Co., 1911.

<sup>27</sup> Sir Francis Younghusband, *Within*. London, Williams & Norgate, 1912; *Mutual Influence, A Re-View of Religion*. New York, Duffield & Co., 1915.



voices, however, like that of Younghusband, are proclaiming the doom of that conception of divine autocracy. Professor Overstreet, for example, declares that as political theory has advanced from the conception of the sovereign as an arbitrary ruler to the view that the ruler represents the will of the ruled, so theology must develop "from the view that God is the individual person in whose princely hands lies the sovereignty of the universe, to the view, more nearly consistent with the spirit of democracy, that God is the Common Will of all living creatures." Prominent among exponents of this view was Walter Rauschenbusch, whose premature death is a grief to us all. In his last volume, he wrote,<sup>28</sup> "Those whose religious life has been influenced by the social gospel are instinctively out of sympathy with autocratic conceptions of God."

Is "Father," then, a fitting title for God? The naturalistic thinkers of the past generation — such as Emerson, Carlyle, Seeley, Arnold — thought so, and, at least occasionally, made use of it. Not a few today, however, are, like Younghusband, abandoning even that. Mr. Wells insists, with glowing rhetoric, that God is Youth, and regards as obsolete the "patriarchal phase" of religion. Mr. Overstreet had already insisted that the God of loving protection, the Parent God, must be supplanted by the God that is our own inner ideal life. And Professor Adler, a prophet, as we all know, of the deepest spiritual fervor, had even earlier declared not only that it is "an anomaly for men who, in the realm of politics, regard king-worship as a thing of the past, to preserve king-worship in religion," but further, that the metaphor "Heavenly Father" no longer represents truly the conception which is possible to us.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Walter Rauschenbusch, *A Theology for the Social Gospel*. The Macmillan Co., 1917.

<sup>29</sup> Felix Adler, *The Religion of Duty*. New York, McClure, Phillips & Co., 1905.

Mr. Bernard Shaw, who, in that delightful play *Androcles and the Lion*, showed his ability to appreciate the Christian spirit, tells us in its preface that "Jesus declared that the reality behind the popular belief in God was a creative spirit in ourselves, called by him the Heavenly Father, and by us Evolution, Élan Vital, Life Force, and other names." One may question Mr. Shaw's scholarship and taste in ascribing his own point of view to the Galilean, and his equation of terms is doubtless too indiscriminate; but it is suggestive of the attempts being made on all hands to find scientific equivalents for hallowed terms and doctrines, to discover their empirical foundation.

This is the clearest impression made upon a spectator of the confused and groping quest of these contemporary pilgrims. They are looking for what the present writer called in a recent volume <sup>30</sup> "The God of Experience." They are seeking so to formulate and "explain their use of the term 'God' as to make the denial of His reality impossible." <sup>31</sup> Mr. Wells speaks for many when he says that "modern religion bases its knowledge of God and its account of God entirely upon experience. It has encountered God. It does not argue about God. It relates." Doubtless there is much that experience cannot tell us, or has not told us, about God, as about everything else, that we should like to know. But is it not a valuable achievement to be able to assure the coming generation that the term represents not a mere unevindenced fable or superstition but a solid reality found in normal human experience?

Is this reality what our forebears meant by the name "God"? Or must we, if scrupulous, find a new term for our altered conception? As to this, no one has spoken more to the point than that earnest lover of truth, so

<sup>30</sup> Durant Drake, *Problems of Religion*. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916.

<sup>31</sup> H. B. Mitchell, *Talks on Religion*. Longmans, Green, & Co., 1908.

maligned in his day, and not yet sufficiently appreciated, Ernest Renan.<sup>32</sup> "The word 'God,'" he wrote, "being in possession of the respect of humanity, having a long prescription, and having been employed in noble poetry, its suppression would put humanity off the track. Although it is not very unequivocal, as the scholastics say, it corresponds to an idea sufficiently definite. . . . Tell the simple to live a life of aspiration after truth and beauty, and these words will have no meaning for them. Tell them to love God, not to offend God, and they will understand you marvellously well."

Many contemporaries are voicing the same feeling. To quote but one, that exquisite essayist and poet, Mr. Le Gallienne, protested some years ago against the tendency of modern thinkers to describe the ultimate Reality by "some cold and clumsy circumlocution, to speak of the great Unknown and Unknowable, of the Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness, or maybe simply of Nature: all phrases which fail to include the most essential quality of the conception they attempt to express, namely, its awful and mysterious majesty. It cannot be doubted that the one English word for that conception must ever be — God."<sup>33</sup>

It is natural for the scrupulous to feel that, to avoid ambiguity, an altered concept should have a new name. This was doubtless what the professor in the story had in mind when he began his lecture with the words: "There are those who say there is a God; there are those who say there is no God. Gentlemen, the truth lies between them."

Ambiguous the word "God" hopelessly is. But what is the core of meaning that persists through all fluctuations? Is Dr. Coit right in saying in a remarkable recent

<sup>32</sup> Ernest Renan, *Intolerance in Scepticism*, in *The Poetry of the Celtic Races and Other Studies*.

<sup>33</sup> Richard Le Gallienne, *The Religion of a Literary Man*. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1893.

volume<sup>34</sup> that "to ask, Is there a God? is to ask whether there be in very fact any source from which supreme blessings will be gained if one attends steadfastly and reverently to it"? However this may be, any conception that has had such a checkered history might well suffer, one would suppose, a few more changes. No one except the uncritical adherents of traditional dogma believes today in such a God as the ancient Jews worshipped; it is doubtful if many *really* believe in the grim potter-God of St. Paul. Mature thought must — though often with a passing sadness of heart, and always with utmost reverence for the thought and faith of the past — put away childish things. It is impossible that the great truths which science has revealed in the past nineteen centuries should not profoundly have altered our view of the ultimate realities from that of the naïve and prescientific believers of the primitive Christian gospel. And we must remember that Christian theology, as it eventually crystallized, is more Greek than Hebraic. Perhaps our modern God-ideas have really (as Mr. Shaw evidently feels) more of the spirit of the Master's teaching than the Hellenic subtleties of the Nicene creed — or even of the Fourth Gospel.

Certainly contemporary scholarship is doing much to revise our understanding of primitive Christianity. For example, Professor Bowen has conclusively shown in a volume which is one of the best fruits of American Biblical scholarship,<sup>35</sup> that the view of the resurrection found even in the Synoptic Gospels differs sharply from that of the earliest apostolic tradition. And another of our leading New Testament scholars, Professor Kirsopp Lake of Harvard, points out<sup>36</sup> that the phrase "a personal God" "scarcely belongs to the great period of forma-

<sup>34</sup> Stanton Coit, *The Soul of America*. The Macmillan Co., 1914.

<sup>35</sup> C. R. Bowen, *The Resurrection in the New Testament*. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1911.

<sup>36</sup> In the *New Republic*, June 9, 1917.



tive Christian theology." "In popular language personality means anthropomorphic individuality. . . . To believe that God has this kind of personality is not orthodox; it is not even heretical; it is merely heathenism of an inferior type." If this be true, it gives point to Dr. Moberly's admonition,<sup>37</sup> "Revise your conception of personality."

What matters, however, in the last analysis, is not how close our conception may approach, or how far it may veer, from the thought of earlier days; not even whether we are to use the term "God" or not; what is vital is that we should retain the sense of the worth and meaning of life which that sacred word connotes. Of the men of the future Mr. Lowes Dickinson writes,<sup>38</sup> "It may be a personal God that they conceive, it may be a 'tendency in the universe'; it may be something which they prefer to call 'Earth' or 'Nature'; it may be an 'Absolute'; but, in any case, it is something not themselves and greater than themselves, something which, by its mere existence, makes everything supremely worth while, overrides and subsumes Evil, intensifies and makes omnipresent Good, and concentrates and satisfies in itself those ideal impulses that otherwise would be tortured and broken about an imperfect self."

The immediate influence of the war is, on the whole, to deepen conventional conceptions of God. This is no time for any but a few detached thinkers to analyze coolly, to balance probabilities, to formulate new *aperçus*. Most men now must lean hard on what they already have. But after the war, when reconstruction is vigorous in every field, whither shall our masters lead us in this dearest of all quests?

Professor Coe, one of our keenest contemporary students of religion, assures us that "the thought of God

<sup>37</sup> W. H. Moberly, in *Foundations*. The Macmillan Co., 1913.

<sup>38</sup> G. Lowes Dickinson, *Religion, A Criticism and a Forecast*. New York, McClure, Phillips, & Co., 1905.

may, indeed, undergo yet many transformations, but in one form or another it will be continually renewed as an expression of the depth and the height of social aspiration." <sup>39</sup> Is he a true prophet? Certainly there is no more interesting question for the future to answer. Are we going to abandon religion in the ardor of our new tasks? Are we to turn with renewed zeal to religion but free it more and more from theolatriy? Or are we perhaps at the verge of a great new vision of God, which shall lead us into ways that it hath not yet entered into our hearts to conceive?

<sup>39</sup> George A. Coe, *Psychology of Religion*. University of Chicago Press, 1916.

LORD ACTON'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY <sup>1</sup>

CRANE BRINTON

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

"I have never had any contemporaries," said Lord Acton toward the close of his life; and, in the main, he was right. His broad cosmopolitanism made him impatient of English insularity. His belief in the necessity of freedom of conscience alienated him, in spirit if not in form, from the church of his birth. His insistence upon the absolute validity of the moral law as the final measure of all things isolated him in the midst of a century which seemed largely to have concluded that morality and success are synonymous. Certain it is that his own age did not estimate him over highly. At his death in 1902 there were not a few who asserted that for all his depth of erudition, Acton had contributed nothing to the sum of human knowledge. He had been an omnivorous reader and possessed a greater knowledge of the sources of modern history than any other man of his day. Yet all this store of learning had been of no avail to the world, for Acton had written nothing. At his death, a lecture in English, a letter in German, were all that represented Acton on the shelves of the library of his own university, Cambridge. Even today, after his lectures, his letters, and his periodical writings have been collected and edited, his output remains small: two volumes of lectures, three of letters, two of historical essays contributed to the reviews of his time. Yet in spite of the scantiness of his written work, Acton must be numbered among the great historians of the last century. Great-

<sup>1</sup> Copyright, 1919, by Crane Brinton.

ness is not susceptible to quantitative analysis. A historian's influence is not to be measured by the number of volumes in octavo he brings forth. Acton's few pages are sufficient to define his attitude toward history. His life shows how intimate for him was the bond between a knowledge of the past and a reasoned course of conduct in the present. What is important for the world in Acton is not the extent of his writings, but the depth of his thinking. We are interested, not so much in his broad erudition as in the living core of his thought, his philosophy of history.

John Acton was born in Naples on the tenth of January, 1834. His father, Sir Richard Acton, came from an old family of English country squires which had kept to the Catholic faith. His mother was a Dalberg, a member of a distinguished South German family. John was educated first at Oscott, one of the leading Catholic colleges in England, and then at Munich under Döllinger. Acton is thus marked off from the majority of his countrymen by his religion and his cosmopolitanism. It is precisely these factors that determined his outlook on life, that served most to forge his character. He was a sincere Catholic. To this he owed his moral austerity, his sense of the gravity of history and its ethical import. The German element in Acton shows itself in a scientific thoroughness of research, in a fund of scholarship not wholly free from a sort of unwieldy bulkiness. He is at bottom, however, an Englishman. His ideal of liberty is determined by an English respect for law and custom, an English recognition of the principle of growth in political institutions. He had none of the blindly doctrinaire idealism of the continental liberal; rather, he follows the tradition of the Whigs. The cosmopolitan character of his interests, however, lifted him above the pettiness of partisan standards. His Whiggism is never the Whiggism of a Macaulay. Acton strives to draw



from every historic occurrence its universal application, its truth; and this truth is an absolute, a principle whose distortion is crime.

Acton's attitude toward history is thus blocked out in the circumstances of his birth and education. For those who would understand his position as a historian his later life marks but two important events — his struggle with ultramontaniam and his professorship at Cambridge. On his return to England from Germany, Acton edited successively the *Rambler* and the *Home and Foreign Review*, journals through which, as some one has said, he set out "to convert the world to a synthesis of learning, liberalism, and Catholicism." Such ideals soon brought him into conflict with Rome. His journals were officially condemned and he was forced to suspend their publication. His long struggle with ultramontaniam culminated in the utter defeat of the Liberal Catholics at the Vatican Council of 1870. After the declaration of papal infallibility by the council, Acton withdrew from open ecclesiastical controversy. Believing, however, that the decree of infallibility might be so mildly interpreted as to rob it of its dangers, he never took the decisive step of withdrawing from the Catholic communion. The conflict, however, had left a permanent impression upon him. It confirmed his conviction that absolute power, whether in church or in state, is an evil not to be endured; it gave him a motive for a searching inquiry into the past of his church, an inquiry which served to strengthen his hatred for religious persecution in all its forms.

The next twenty years of Acton's life were passed in diligent reading in preparation for his projected *History of Liberty*. He welcomed his appointment as Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge in 1895 as an opportunity to carry out his plan. The *Cambridge Modern History*, as Acton originally conceived it, was but a fragment of a greater work which was to trace the

slow progress of the human race toward freedom. But the task was too gigantic even for a scholar of Acton's calibre; and Acton himself pursued his passion for absolute certainty of evidence so far that most of his time was spent in investigation, and little left for creative work. Acton died with the *History of Liberty* still unwritten. His Cambridge years, however, were by no means barren. In these few short years his personality stamped itself upon the historical thought of the university; and the two volumes of his lectures on modern history and on the French Revolution give us in their full ripeness the sum of his historical judgments.

History was not to Acton a mere academic pursuit. With that view of history which considers it, beneath the dry light of science, as a series of phenomena capable of detachment from the present, susceptible to separate analysis, he had no sympathy. Still less did he consider history a mere form of literary exposition. The one justification for the study of history was to Acton its value as a guide in the affairs of the every-day world. The present is what it is because of what the past has been. Human development has been a continuous chain of cause and effect. Any course of action in the present must be based upon a knowledge of the way in which things we now do are hedged in, limited by what men have done before us. History thus becomes a great mentor, a schoolmaster of action.

Acton does not mean by this that we are to become blind worshippers of the past. He dislikes that type of conservatism which obstinately faces backward to glue its eyes on the days of old as much as he does that doctrinaire revolutionism of the French which would abolish history. History is a valuable guide, not only because it serves to delimit our field of action, but because it allows us to profit by the errors of our predecessors. As Acton says, "If the Past has been a burden, a knowledge

of the Past is the safest and surest emancipation." Moreover, a knowledge of history prevents us from confusing what is transitory and unimportant with the things that really count; it forces us to fasten on abiding issues. Only through historical insight can we separate in the maze of present-day politics selfish interests from social principles. In the highest sense, history is to Acton a philosophy. It is the sum of man's achievement; its proper interpretation affords the key to his destiny.

To Acton, then, "history, the record of truths revealed by experience, is eminently practical, as an instrument of action and a power that goes to the making of the future." But to achieve this function it must not take the shape of a mass of uncoördinated details. The great bulk of historical data must be given an orderly shape, must be interpreted. The historian cannot, however, be content with the mere winnowing of patiently acquired data. He must appraise the place of events in the scheme of things. He must not read his own prejudices into events, nor must he seek in history an orderly system in which every item can be properly pigeon-holed. Acton gave an excellent summary of his own historical method in reply to a correspondent who had quoted Vinet's "*Il faut que l'historien ait un parti; amour de vérité abstraite, chimère.*" "*Oui et non,*" wrote Acton. "*Oui, l'historien doit avoir un parti . . . mais il doit faire aussi la part de ce qui est incertain, du côté faible, de la vertu, du talent et du mérite des malfaiteurs. En l'histoire, tout est porté, limité, interprété par une masse d'antécédents qui ne souffrent pas une désignation exclusive.*"

Acton believed that history could be rendered truly significant only by testing the conformity of its content with two fundamental principles: first, the right of every man to freedom of conscience; second, the unfailing authority of the moral law. These principles are not injected into the mass of historic detail in some esoteric

manner, like the Kantian categories into the world of sensation. They are not metaphysical absolutes applied to history, not *a priori* rules to rationalize historic data. They are rather truths which result from a historic induction; they are to be inferred from a study of the course of history. Once recognized and applied to the course of events, these principles serve to give meaning to separate phenomena, as the laws of modern science serve to bring various physical activities into orderly connection. History thus gives us the account of the gradual and painful progress of the race toward freedom and morality. A given historical event, once every fact of evidence which can be known about it has been discovered by an impartial investigation, must be judged by its part in this upward progress, by its contribution to ethical freedom. The absolute paramountcy of these standards of freedom and morality was to Acton the lesson of history. That others, starting with a similar basis of historic evidence, should draw from it a teaching as diametrically opposed to his as "Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht" merely proved to him how strong were the forces of evil in this world. Acton was profoundly convinced of his own rightness. His conception of the significance of history is undoubtedly the reflection of his character. However much he may seek for objectivity of judgment, however much he may wish events themselves to mould his generalizations, we cannot but feel that in the end he is interpreting things in terms of his own personality. Hence there appears in his standards of historic judgment a certain rigidity, a certain absoluteness, which removes them, in a way, from subjection to that historic growth which produced them. In brief, Acton does not wholly succeed in making history a true induction; there remains in his categories of freedom and morality a suggestion of fixity and immutability which divorces them from the every-day world.



All this will appear more clearly in an examination of the precise nature of these standards.

Acton's definition of liberty has become famous. "By liberty I mean the assurance that every man shall be protected in doing what he believes to be his duty against the influence of authority and majorities, custom and opinion." Surely it is an ideal which does not lack in force of aspiration. Freedom of conscience is to Acton the highest ideal of human progress. Liberty, in this sense, is not a means of attaining a better political system; it is in itself the highest end of all political effort. It is just because liberty is the goal of the race that it forms a criterion for the judgment of history. Though this definition of liberty is perhaps a counsel of perfection, Acton does not mean it to be purely Utopian in character. Liberty is something which operates here among us. It has never been completely realized; it has been subject to violation and abuse by those who did not understand it. But it has persisted, and all history records its increasing sway over the minds and action of men.

Acton defines liberty in terms of the individual will; but that does not mean that the individual is free to act at his own caprice. Acton realizes that absolute freedom, like absolute despotism, is an impossibility. No man can have complete control over another, even over his slave, for the slave always has the alternative of suicide. Similarly, no man can be unqualifiedly free as long as another human being exists and has relations with him. Acton saw the full truth of Aristotle's statement that man is a social animal. Hence he saw that an individual's liberty is always contingent upon the liberty of others. Freedom is in a sense merely the harmonious functioning of all parts of the social order. Because he considered social progress as necessarily evolutionary, Acton made respect for law and tradition an important factor in true freedom. Nothing is to be

achieved by seeking to wipe out all that mankind has done and then attempting to make over the world completely. Such a process is impossible, and founded upon a false reasoning, which seeks to remove man from his social and historical background and consider him as an abstract entity. In his respect for law and order, his doctrine of the gradual evolution of institutions, his dislike for the political theory of the French Revolution, Acton is a lineal descendant of Burke. His notion of liberty is essentially English, a less partisan, less selfish, and less insular form of the doctrines of 1688.

The surest test for the existence of liberty in a society is for Acton the amount of security enjoyed by minorities. In the Oriental despotism there are no minorities — and no freedom. It is through the existence of a variety of opinion within a state, such as is afforded by the freedom of minorities, that men's minds are kept open to the possibility of progress. Acton is at base an individualist, and he has no respect for authority apart from knowledge. He dreaded an absolute power in the state as the possible — nay, the inevitable — enthronement of error. Only by a recognition of the rights of minorities can there prevail that open-mindedness essential to the reign of truth. From the very fact that he founds his whole philosophy on the duty of the individual to base his conduct on the dictates of his conscience, Acton denies the right of the state to absorb completely the personality of its citizens. The Hegelian concept of the good of the state as the highest goal of human endeavor is to him as dangerous as the blunter absolutism of the Roman Empire. Modern democracy, in so far as it stands for the tyranny of the majority, is equally harmful to true liberty. For what assurance have we that the majority will be right? True liberty can exist only when the state is recognized as possessing a limited competence. The state cannot, for instance, transgress upon the domain of

religious bodies, unless the practice of those bodies prove injurious to the welfare of society as a whole. Each one of these bodies has a life, a purpose, a will, just as does the state. Where their purposes do not conflict with the higher end of the state, the law of freedom forbids the state to interfere with them. This is the real significance of the security of minorities. It means that no power stifles the free play of conscience, that within the state various other social groups may work out in freedom their contribution to the good of humanity.

Recognition of the evolutionary character of social progress, respect for law and order and our whole historic inheritance, security of minorities — all this is for Acton implicit in the definition of liberty as freedom of conscience. Because he was a man of profound religious conviction, Acton could base everything on the individual's sense of right and wrong. If a man is truly moral — and for Acton morality is not purely intuitional with the individual, but a reasoned obedience to a perfectly definite code of laws — he will make his liberty founded upon an appreciation of his obligations to society. Liberty of conscience does not imply a state of anarchy where each one will go his own way regardless of his fellows. On the contrary, its perfect realization would mean the attainment of that mean between anarchy and despotism which is the aim of political endeavor. Freedom of conscience would attain this result because it would subject all to the moral law; and the moral law is a given norm, uniform and unchanging, recognizable by all. Ideally, all consciences are thus guided by the same force. This conception of the moral law is the key to Acton's thought. Once the precise meaning he gives to morality is known, and his philosophy of history becomes clear.

The value of a historical event in moulding our conduct is measured by its ethical teaching. It is the

office of the historian to see that everything that has occurred in the past is appraised for its moral content. He must see to it that no shams live to perpetuate themselves. He must first of all investigate thoroughly the facts of a given case. But his function is not merely one of research; he must judge. He has as the basis of his judgments the moral law, perfect and unalterable. "Opinions alter, manners change, creeds rise and fall, but the moral law is written on the tablets of eternity." Acton is able to conceive of the moral law as absolute because, for him, ethics is a religion. Christianity meant to him primarily the Golden Rule, and for its more strictly theological aspects he cared little. He once wrote to Creighton: "You would imply that Christianity is a mere system of metaphysics which borrowed some ethics from elsewhere. It is rather a system of ethics which borrowed its metaphysics elsewhere." Since the moral law is thus a matter of religion and finds its source in inspiration, Acton is able to give it a character of fixity and oneness.

With all the austere majesty in which Acton clothes his ethics, the good life yet remains something we can all recognize, strive for, and in a measure obtain. Only the most opinionated of pragmatists can accuse him of having failed to give us a system of ethics which will get down into the dirt of every-day life and help clean up that dirt. Acton's moral code is simple. "It is the common, even vulgar code that I appeal to," he once said. The distinction between good and bad does not involve fine-spun philosophical arguments. It is to a certain extent intuitional. We can all agree on certain things that are good and others that are bad. For Acton, the Christian code of morals summed up all that was best in human nature. It formed an eternal truth of religion and just for that reason it was eminently practical, something that could be a real part of our lives. Acton believed



that he had found the heart of the moral law in the principle that human life is a sacred gift, and that it must be treated as sacred. It is the greatest of crimes to take human life without reason. Around this central principle Acton groups the rest of his ethical teachings, as a whole very simple, and summed up in the teachings of Christ.

With this conception of the nature of morality and its function in the interpretation of history, Acton was naturally bitterly opposed to many of the tendencies of his age. He combated with all his strength the notion that history shows that the capable is always the moral, and that therefore what has been has of necessity been right. Viewed in the light of a superior law of right and wrong, history shows countless incidents in which wrong has triumphed, but remained wrong. It is the duty of the historian, in Acton's mind, to point out these incidents, to hold them up for condemnation, to exhibit them as errors to avoid. Wrong is in itself a thing of evil, even though it may be victorious. The distinction between good and evil is based upon a law which is prior, superior to the happenings of the day; it does not consist in the result of those happenings. Acton's view of the moral law likewise caused him to condemn the inclination to excuse the sins of a period as due to the "spirit of the time." Different ages cannot have different moral standards; what is wrong in one age must be wrong in another, for the moral law is timeless.

Acton would not for a moment admit the possibility of a divorce between politics and ethics. Statesman and private citizen are alike subject to the demands of morality. Indeed, the transgressions of the statesman are the more serious, for they affect the policy of whole peoples. "I cannot accept the canon that we are to judge Pope or King unlike other men, with a favorable presumption that they did no wrong. If there is any presumption,

it is the other way, against the holders of power, increasing as the power increases. Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. . . . The inflexible integrity of the moral code is to me the secret of the authority, the dignity, the utility of history." The activities of states are in Acton's view equally bound by the demands of morality. He saw clearly the danger to civilization which lies in the doctrine that the state is above all restraint, that only the dictates of its own convenience or advantage govern its relation with other states.

History, then, is a practical guide to action, the lesson taught us by the experience of the race. It is easily intelligible because through its complicated course run two inseparable truths: the right of every man to give unhindered obedience to the voice of his conscience, and the eternally binding force of that unalterable moral law which governs his conscience. In broad outlines, this is Acton's historical philosophy. It will gain in meaning if we consider its application to specific historical problems.

Acton's estimate of our Civil War is an illustration at once of the strength and weakness of his attitude toward history. The American state, he says, was founded on the federative principle; that is, certain smaller bodies surrendered to a larger one created by their own union definite rights, while each contracting body retained other definite rights for itself. Through the effectiveness of this distribution of power, America prospered for several generations. Gradually, however, the Jeffersonian idea that the will of the majority is law and that no one can have rights over against the majority began to take root. Opposed to his was the theory that the principles of law and order and morality are superior to the popular will, and that minorities too have positive rights. Those who held to the first view naturally supported the power

of the federal government over the states, for through the federal government could best be secured that uniformity which was the goal of democratic absolutism. The other party maintained the doctrine of states' rights. The North and South went to war not because of slavery — this was but the match that kindled the fire — but because absolute power and restrictions upon its exercise cannot exist together. The whole position of the South is "a repudiation of the doctrine that men can enforce no rights, and that the majority can do no wrong."

Acton's main thesis, that the American government has been tending toward a deification of the will of the majority and that the Civil War was a great step toward centralization, is undoubtedly correct. The victory of the North was primarily a blow at the doctrine of states' rights. Just here, however, can be distinguished the limitations of a historical method which, like Acton's, judges everything by wholly inelastic standards. He picks out some one aspect of things which best serves him to set off or expound his standards and neglects other equally important aspects. His desire to make the moral lesson of history clear cut causes him to oversimplify the content of historic fact. He admitted that in history no sharpness of outline must be sought, that everything is qualified, limited. But in his own work he failed to carry out this method. Granted that on the whole the political philosophy of the North can be embodied in the statement that the will of the majority is law; might not the temporary ascendancy of this doctrine be less damaging to the good of America and persistence of freedom than that of the theory that the union is merely one of convenience? In other words, if Northern centralization tended to tyranny, did not Southern particularism tend to anarchy? Acton, as a true liberal, ought surely to have looked with apprehension at the narrow utilitarianism which lay behind the doctrines of nullifi-

cation and secession. Moreover had Acton applied completely his own principle, that a historical event is to be judged by its moral effect, his conclusion must have been different. A community which subjects some of its members to bodily enslavement is obviously transgressing the spirit of Christian morals. The effect of the institution of slavery upon a people is to render it callous to human rights and to introduce the very principle of absolute power which was the chief object of Acton's hatred. It would seem that in regard to the Civil War the problem is this: given the circumstances of the case, which would prove less disastrous to the attainment of ethical good, the Northern doctrine of the divine right of the majority or the Southern institution of slavery, coupled with the Southern doctrine of secession? Viewed in the light of the consequences which are implied in the opposing principles, moral justification must be given the North. Had Acton been less intent on finding in the federal victory a regrettable success of Jeffersonian democracy over true liberalism, he must have seen that there were elements of right and wrong on both sides, and that the final result must be measured by the balance of ethical values.

Acton lived in the midst of the period which witnessed the rise of nationalism and the unification of Italy and Germany. His attitude on the nationalist movement affords an excellent example of how he sought to apply a knowledge of history to the solution of the problems of his own day. Furthermore, his conclusions have a living value as bearing upon a problem which confronts us imperatively at this moment. His essay on "Nationality," published in 1862, soon after the virtual completion of Italian unity under Cavour, embodies the practical application of his philosophy to contemporary problems.

Acton finds the source of the national movement, like that of the liberal movement, in a protest against the



abuses of the old régime. Nationalism, as the feeling of "a community which imposes upon its members a consistent similarity of character, interest, and opinion," had been throughout history a normal characteristic of many European race groups. The absolutist dynasties of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had waged wars and cut up kingdoms wholly for their own selfish interests, without considering the character and interests of the population. This state of affairs came to a head in the partitions of Poland, and it was these partitions which awoke the Polish people to a sense that they were really one and united them against their oppressors. Then came the French Revolution, and the doctrine of nationalism was grafted upon its other precepts. The state was brought into being to register the general will. But the general will is one and all-compelling, and the state must therefore be one and absolute. The logical application of Rousseau's doctrines meant the unlimited power of the state as expressed through popular sovereignty. If the state is to be one, it cannot permit the existence of community interests within it; hence, racial, lingual, provincial, and national differences within it must be abolished. Several nationalities cannot form a state, for state and nation must be coextensive. In pursuance of this theory the Convention proceeded to attempt to eradicate all traces of local differences in France and sought to make of France a perfect ethnographic unit. This spirit is characteristic of the nationalist movements of the nineteenth century. They are not so much movements for national liberty as for national unity. Harsh intolerance of other races inhabiting the same state is an invariable accompaniment. In many cases the dominant race forcibly imposes its language and civilization on the weaker ones. Acton lived to see this practice in its worst form in the Magyarization of Hungary and the Germanization of Alsace-Lorraine and Posen.

The evil results of this theory of nationality, continues Acton, are many. The perfect nation-state is an ideal entity, an abstraction, a body founded without regard for historic growth and racial diversity. It shares the doctrinaire character of the other tenets of the Jacobin Revolution. Put to the test of contact with the world, such a theory leads to absolutism of the worst kind. There is nothing between the individual and the state, and there can thus be no guarantee of private rights. Acton's own words on the subject are well worth quoting: "Whenever a single definite object is made the supreme end of the state, be it the advantage of a class, the safety or power of the country, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or the support of any speculative idea, the state becomes for the time inevitably absolute. Liberty alone demands for its realization the limitation of public authority."

In contrast to this theory Acton brings forward another theory of nationality, based not on national unity, but on national union. It is quite obvious that the aspirations of every European nationality to sovereign statehood cannot be realized. Sufficient testimony to this fact is afforded by the mixture of races in Austria-Hungary and the Balkans. Moreover, even if nation and state might always be coextensive, such a condition would not be desirable. The existence of several national groups under one government forms a positive guarantee of liberty. These groups resist the tendencies of centralization and absolutism in the state; they form associations which help give expression to diverse interests, make political life richer by preventing dire uniformity, insure progress through healthy rivalry, balance group interests for the good of the whole.

For still another reason state and nation ought not to coincide. Patriotic attachment to one's racial nation is largely physical, primitive, while allegiance to the

political nation is ethical. The first is founded upon instincts which, like love of family, are primarily selfish. Race feeling is merely an extension of tribal feeling, and is based on the instinct of self-preservation. Only in the political order is self-preservation transformed into a higher moral purpose which may involve self-sacrifice, for the state is organized for public interests which transcend those of private individuals. In no case, however, must the individual allow love for his nation or obedience to his state to transcend every moral consideration. Here, as everywhere, the individual must appeal to his conscience. "The man who prefers his country before every other duty shows the same spirit as the man who surrenders every right to the state. They both deny that right is superior to authority."

State and nation, then, are fundamentally different, and the only guarantee of true liberty is the existence of several nationalities in federal organization under one government. The theory that nation and state must be one inevitably leads to absolutism and to this extent it is a retrograde step in history. It has, however, successfully carried out its function, the destruction of the old régime. The democratic movement alone, without the aid of nationalist enthusiasm, could never have accomplished this end. Moreover, the nationalist theory marks the culmination and hence the exhaustion of the revolutionary principle. It aims neither at liberty, as did the early French revolutionists, nor at prosperity, as did the socialists of 1848. It sacrifices everything to the sterile purpose of national interests. The individual will is submerged in the collective will, which is guided, not by law and reason, but by the mere accident of race. In this very excess the nationalist theory carries the germ of its own dissolution.

Acton's treatment of nationalism thus brings out very clearly how his theory of liberty is one of balance of

interests, how much it is a protest against sweeping denials of historic forces in favor of a single doctrine. His conclusions on the historical purport of the movement seem borne out by the course of recent events. That national feeling can become the invaluable auxiliary of state despotism of the worst kind is shown in the rise of the German Empire. The present war is largely the outcome of the doctrine of the absolute nation-state, supreme within its own borders, bound in its relations to other states by no law, because itself above all law. Acton's own theory of nationalism is of value in its bearing upon the reconstruction which must follow the war. It is becoming increasingly evident that the only possible solution of the national difficulties in Europe is the recognition of an authority higher than national interests. A really federative organization in which each nationality would possess self-government and local independence seems the only way out of the complicated racial tangles of eastern and central Europe.

Acton's political philosophy is, as we have seen, basically individualistic, in that he believes that every man must appeal to his own conscience for the ultimate sanction for all action. The conscience of mankind is determined by a common ethical inheritance, by a distinction between right and wrong which is clear and valid in all cases. Along with this insistence upon absolute freedom of conscience Acton maintains that deep respect for the forces of law and historic tradition which forms the essence of Whiggism. Obviously, we have here a form of the eternal antithesis — liberty and authority. Shall the individual always obey the dictates of his conscience, or shall he sometimes, aware of the futility of protest, find it expedient to yield to an authority which he knows to be wrong? Given his belief in the supremacy of the moral law, Acton could but answer that right alone is expedient. The difficulty here arises that most of us



take our ethics upon authority and that for the average man no such sharp division exists between the two as Acton would create. It has been the function of the church to disseminate its ethical teachings among its members. The Christian believer looks to his church for his moral standards—that is, he bases his ethics on authority. The church then has a peculiarly sacred position as guardian of public morality. The slightest deviation from right on the part of the clergy may thus prove most detrimental to the good of the community. Evil committed by the clergy can least of all be condoned, for it is the most penetrating of all evil. The general principles of morality are eternal and immutable, superior to narrow sectarian interests. If the governing powers of any church violate the moral law, the individual who is truly moral will refuse to abide by their action. This is precisely the conclusion to which Acton is led. It might be urged against him that, in view of the lofty purpose of the church, some slight debasement of the moral coin might be countenanced if only good resulted in the end. If opposition to a course not strictly moral would lead to disruption of the church and its failure to carry out its mission, would it not be better to acquiesce in the wrong, especially if it may be glossed over and its consequences minimized? Briefly, the problem is this: Given a moral code which absolutely separates right and wrong, can the commission of a wrong be justified on the ground that it will lead to a greater right? Acton's relations to his own church serve as his final answer to this, the crucial problem of his philosophy.

Acton's faith in his religion was profound and unquestioning; it was not for that reason narrow and intolerant. He once wrote of himself as a man "who started in life believing himself a sincere Catholic and a sincere Liberal; who therefore renounced everything in Catholicism that was not compatible with liberty and

everything in Politics that was not compatible with Catholicism." It was no light task. As Acton viewed the historic career of the Catholic Church, he could not but see that many of her acts were wholly incompatible with his own convictions. We have seen that his religion was primarily an ethical system. In so far as those who controlled the policy of the Catholic Church violated those ethical precepts upon which the Catholic religion is founded, Acton would repudiate their acts. If the body of the Church consented to the immoral acts of its rulers, it had ceased to be perfectly Catholic. In other words, Catholicity and the policy of the Catholic Church have not been identical save when church policy has been in accordance with that moral law which forms the heart of the Catholic faith.

Acton found that the history of his church disclosed many offences against the principle of liberty and the moral law. Church organization made the pope an absolute sovereign. But absolutism in the church is open to the same objections which make absolutism in the state intolerable. It is bound to lead to arbitrariness, subjects the ruler to the temptations of misuse of power, and affords no guarantee that the moral law will be respected. It becomes inevitably immoral. The history of the papacy bears this out. The boundless and unattainable claims of Boniface were the result of lack of limitation on papal power. Luther came largely as a protest against papal tyranny and misgovernment. On the other hand, it is not sufficient that the Conciliar movement attempted the limitation of papal absolutism to gain Acton's approval for the movement. He finds the Councils imbued with purely worldly motives. They wished to restrict the papacy partly for their own aggrandizement, partly in the interests of the secular states of Europe. Gerson and the rest of the reformers were first of all promoting their own selfish ends. Then too, the Councils carried out

a vigorous policy of persecution. To Acton, the burning of Hus alone suffices to condemn the whole Conciliar movement.

Religious persecution, along with papal absolutism, have been the chief crimes of the Church against liberty. Persecution is always a useless thing, for belief is a spiritual force, and can never come from the outside, from sheer physical pressure. Moreover, persecution is immoral not only because it reacts upon the persecutor and makes him careless of law, brutal, bigoted, but because it may result in the suppression of truth. Toleration is vindicated by the fact that truth can never suffer in open conflict with falsity. Give truth free rein and it will by its very nature emerge victorious. Falsity, however, must always depend not on moral but on physical force. The danger in persecution lies in the fact that it may be employed on the side of the false. Indeed, as soon as any great and good principle enlists the aid of persecution it falsifies itself. Liberty of conscience is the only guarantee for the triumph of moral principles in the life of a community. When the Catholic Church made use of persecution to stamp out heresy it was acting contrary to the spirit of Catholicism.

The most serious offence of the rulers of the Church has been their failure to adhere to the moral law. The stamping out of heresy, the extension of papal influence in European courts, papal acquisition of worldly wealth, all were achieved by methods distinctly at variance with the Golden Rule. Jesuit possibilism, which comes down in practice to the profession that the end justifies the means, seemed to Acton the highest degree of immorality. If the means is immoral, it incorporates itself in the end attained, and taints that end. He has best expressed this attitude in a letter written in German: "Die Unsittlichkeit besteht darin, dass man glaubt, die Sünde höre auf, Sünde zu sein, wenn sie für die Zwecke der

Kirche begangen wird. Raub ist nicht Raub, Lüge nicht Lüge, Mord nicht Mord, wenn sie durch religiöse Autoritäten oder Interessen sanktionirt wird. . . . Eine solche Lehre is nicht Irrtum, sondern Sünde, nicht gefährlich, sondern tödtlich. . . . Solche Männer scheinen mir nur fluchwürdig im höchsten Grad, mehr als die gemeinen Verbrecher, weil sie die Religion selbst verwenden, um die Seelen zu verderben."

It is obvious that the Catholic Church has contravened the moral law as Acton understood it. Acton did not hesitate to apply the unfailing canon of morality to church history with even more rigor than to secular history. His essay on "The Massacre of St. Bartholomew" is an unanswerable indictment of religious persecution. The loftiness of the papal position, the greatness of the principles at stake, did not cause him to soften a whit the severity of his judgments upon the popes. Much of the error of centuries past still encumbered the Church as he found it. Acton determined to obliterate that error, to liberalize the Church and to bring it back to true Catholicism. Within the Church, however, the current was flowing in quite the opposite direction. The Ultramontanes were fast gaining for the pope an even more complete absolutism, and were turning the Church away from the life and thought of the time, back to the days of the Schoolmen. The Syllabus of 1864 came as a challenge to all who hoped to reconcile the Church with the progress of the century and to make it a living force for moral improvement. Acton accepted the challenge and put all his strength into the struggle. The declaration of papal infallibility shattered once and for all his hopes of liberalizing the Church. The pope's word was to be supreme and unquestioned. But was not this, judged by Acton's canons, immoral? Must not the man who is truly moral repudiate the decree? Acquiescence here would mean the worst of sins, the putting of authority



above right. It would seem that Acton, like Döllinger, Tyrrell, and Lamennais, must turn away, as a true Catholic, from a church which had ceased to be Catholic. Some years before, Acton had written in answer to the question, "Is it better to renounce the papacy out of horror for its acts or to condone the acts out of reverence for the papacy?" that only the former alternative was possible. Yet now, at the moment of crisis, he did not hesitate to accept the latter.

We have seen how he accepted defeat, remained faithful to the papacy, and strove to minimize the danger of the doctrine of infallibility. It is precisely in this act that his own ethical system breaks down. His choice was simple. The inexorable force of the moral law condemned the papal stand. Acton himself had repeatedly insisted that the true Catholic must maintain the moral law unsullied, that the clergy cease to be God's ministers when they do wrong. He did not, however, choose to repudiate the action of the pope. The reason is simple. Acton must have felt that the disruption of the Church meant a greater moral loss than the admission of papal infallibility. Against the absolutist evil a campaign of education and enlightenment could make real headway. The decree itself, moreover, was so qualified as to deprive it of most of its sting. On the other hand, active opposition meant a schism in the ranks of the Church, the weakening and perhaps the destruction of its power for good. Acton's faith was bound up in the Catholic Church, as such, and he never lost sight of the sacredness of its mission of universality. Better incur a temporary loss of part of its moral strength than wholly abandon that mission. The commission of a wrong may be justified on the ground that it will lead to a greater right. Acton had thus introduced into his moral life that very principle of relativity which he had so sternly rejected from his ethical theory.

As a whole, Acton's philosophy of history is relatively free from complexity and subtlety. It stands out clear-cut, embodied in the cardinal principles of liberty and morality. This simplicity makes it more readily understood, and at the same time more susceptible to critical attack than a system more broadened by qualification. Three general criticisms suggest themselves in an estimate of the value of Acton's work as a historian.

In the first place, it is not always clear that Acton maintains an attitude of impartiality in his judgments of history. It is true that he did not desire impartiality in the sense of scientific aloofness; he did, however, insist on the impartiality of the judge who administers the moral law. "In judging men and things," he said, "ethics go before dogma, politics, or nationality. The ethics of history cannot be denominational." Yet in the greatest crisis of his own life he put dogma before ethics, and we cannot but feel that a man who in private life preferred Catholic unity to moral consistency must have seen history through glasses tinted, if ever so slightly, with doctrinal prejudice. Acton is assuredly harsh enough with sinners in his own church. The man who could write of the popes of the Inquisition that "they were not only wholesale assassins, but they made the principle of assassination a law of the Christian Church and a condition of salvation," was certainly no papal apologist. Save in a vague feeling that the Middle Ages, when one faith ruled all Europe, were a sort of Golden Age, Acton's bias does not appear in his treatment of his own church. When it comes to the services of Protestant statesmen, however, he fails to give the full meed of credit. William the Silent is to him a selfish adventurer, a man who turned lightly from Catholicism to Lutheranism and from Lutheranism to Calvinism as the interest of the moment dictated; in William's case, assassination was almost justifiable. This seems a narrow estimate of a man who

did so much for European liberty and religious toleration as did William. Similarly, Acton's dislike for Cavour is occasioned at bottom by the attacks of the Piedmontese minister upon the Catholic Church. Even his use of the word "infidel" as applied to Protestants, though perhaps natural enough from a Catholic pen, sounds harsh and discordant from a man who held as sacred the principle of toleration.

Moreover, Acton's desire to bring everything under his standards of historical judgment caused him, as in his estimate of the American Civil War, to pick out only the element of a situation which best fitted into those standards. He tends toward sweeping condemnations and equally unrestrained praises. There is a failure to recognize the diversity of life, the nature of the purposes and cross-purposes which actuate man. The mass of historic data is treated as though it can be sorted out into definite piles, the good and the bad. Acton wishes to maintain a definitely scientific attitude toward history in the sense that it must be a true induction. As a matter of fact, he tends to categorize the matter of history, and falls into that very *a priorism* he seeks to avoid.

In the second place, Acton's insistence upon the place of law and tradition at times borders upon an unthinking veneration of what has already grown up. He desires above all things to avoid the futilities and impracticalities of the French Revolution. He accordingly tends to subject everything to the test of conformity with English Whiggism, without considering whether the circumstances of the case made such a conformity desirable. Authority and tradition are emphasized to such an extent as to outweigh the other term in the balance, the ideals and demands of the present. We have a feeling that Acton's liberty after all would only transfer the individual from the authority of external political power to that of a historically determined conscience. There is a lack

of growth in the system. In our anxiety to subject revolution, we seem to have thrown evolution too by the board.

Lastly, this same fixity appears in Acton's ethics. The moral law is given out *en bloc*, as something rigid and immutable. It is the eternal Right which is set up in contrast with mere Authority. Now a more realistic view of morality would see in it the product of social life, a set of rules which man has worked out for himself in his social experience. If this is so, morality has grown and will grow in the future. If the main outlines of the moral law seem permanently established, it is only because man's experience has since the earliest time centred around a few fundamental principles which have proved indispensable guides in life. "Honesty is the best policy" gives expression to one of these principles which have become part of our moral tradition. Around this core there is, so to speak, a margin of morality which is not static, but shifting, growing. The moral law has not had the same content throughout the ages. Primitive man had of necessity views upon the sacredness of human life very different from those of Acton. Bodily slavery is now, among Christian nations, held to be an immoral thing; yet Plato based his ideal state upon the institution of slavery. In other words, our notions of what is right and what is wrong depend upon the specific problems we have to solve, upon all the varied factors of our environment.

In solving these problems, however, we must bring to our aid precisely those results of historic experience which have hardened into the moral law. We must not seek to cut ourselves loose from prevailing notions of right and wrong, to overturn completely the moral law. We cannot, if we would, divorce the present from the past. It was Acton's great service to recall to us, alike in politics and in ethics, the existence of this heritage of past cen-



turies in the shape of the abiding principles which must govern our conduct. In ethics, even more than in politics, he errs by making these principles not abiding, but eternal; not general, but absolute.

Acton's relations with his church show that even he could not apply this austere moral code to his life, and that he could not label everything as specifically and solely good or bad. In the confusion and turmoil of life, we must denominate as good that which seems most likely to result in right; and that right we must identify with harmony, with success. But it is not success in the vulgar sense of mere prevailing, becoming accepted. It is rather a success in conformity with those principles which form our moral inheritance. It is a harmony which develops out of past conflicts through compromises and readjustments governed by the moral law. To Acton, however, the moral law is a static absolute. For this very reason, his system does not at bottom contain that spirit of meliorism which actuated his life, and which caused him to turn to the study of history. The moral law is perfect, and for that very reason we have no way of attaching ourselves to it, no assurance of ethical progress.

Acton's whole philosophy of history thus tends, in the last analysis, toward the setness of a completed system in which there is no room for growth. The great problem of all thinking and all action seems to be the achievement of a proper mean. The problem is everywhere and pervades all problems. We must respect historic rights; yet the exaggeration of this duty leads to Chinese ancestor-worship. We must provide for progress, we must change outworn things; yet the exaggeration of this principle leads straight to the excesses of the Jacobin. In ethics we perceive the same dependence on past standards and the same desire to create new ones. Success can only come through a balance of forces. Acton

errs in overemphasizing the element of permanence; his moral law becomes not so much our guide as our jailer.

As a matter of fact, Acton never hunted down his ideas to their logical conclusion. His life shows an appreciation of the evolutionary character of change, a recognition of the place of the novel in the order of things. It is only a matter of emphasis that permits us to believe that he held rather more with things established than with things that are seeking to establish themselves, rather more with the past than with the present — in short, that if he was a liberal, he was a very conservative one indeed.

In spite of this implied attitude of conservatism, Acton's salient ideas are essentially forward-looking. It is because he had something to teach the world that his name will live. His influence was not confined to his written work. Small in volume though this proved to be, it contains the kernel of his thought and serves to render it accessible to the world. His most potent influence has been felt through the men who studied under him at Cambridge. Though only a few college generations came in contact with him, these few sufficed to take up the thread of his thought and carry it on. That from among his former pupils a considerable school of historians has arisen bears evidence to his power as a teacher. These men look at the world from different points of view. In many cases, they have profoundly modified Acton's teachings. To his fundamental idea, upon which rests the value of his contribution to the world, they have faithfully adhered.

"We have no thread through the enormous intricacies of modern politics except the idea of progress toward more perfect and assured freedom and the divine right of free men." This is the lesson which Acton sought to teach. It is easy to pass into rhapsodic emptiness over

this "divine right of free men." As Acton has said, men have throughout history included under liberty many and conflicting ideals. Yet if history is to mean anything beyond the purposeless conflict of blind desires or the equally purposeless game which the Absolute of Hegel chooses to play with itself, it must be interpreted as the gradual advancement of the individual to the complete and untrammelled expression of his moral self. It was Acton's service that he never ceased to insist upon the true meaning of history in an age which seemed to have forgotten it. The minds of men have not always been proof against the subtle poison of the doctrine that "*Der Gang der Weltgeschichte steht ausserhalb der Tugend, des Lasters, und der Gerechtigkeit.*" The discoveries of Darwin, misunderstood and misapplied, served the nineteenth century as proof of the fact that success alone counts, no matter how attained. Against that dangerous philosophy which, from the Sophists to Nietzsche, has asserted that might is right, Acton maintained that there is a right beyond the mere exigencies of the moment, that there is a jural principle of ethics by which we may judge an action, and that it is the mission of history to teach that principle. "I exhort you," he said to his pupils at Cambridge, "never to debase the moral currency, but to try others by the final maxim that governs your own lives, and to suffer no man and no cause to escape the undying penalty which history has the power to inflict on wrong." He could have no finer epitaph.

## BOOK REVIEWS

EARLY BABYLONIAN LETTERS FROM LARSA. HENRY FREDERICK LUTZ, Ph.D.  
(Yale Oriental Series, Babylonian Texts, Vol. II). Yale University Press.  
1917. Pp. 41. Pl. lvii. \$5.00.

Through the effort and discriminating judgment of Professor A. T. Clay, Yale University has acquired what is probably to be regarded as the most interesting collection of Babylonian tablets in this country. The philological and archæological material of the Babylonian Collection is being published in the Yale Oriental Series, the initial volume of which was issued by Professor Clay in 1915. The second volume is by one of Professor Clay's pupils, and contains the autographed text of one hundred and fifty-two early letters from Larsa, accompanied by two plates of half-tone reproductions, an introduction, and the usual name-lists.

The evidence presented by Dr. Lutz is convincing that these letters came from the mounds of Senkereh, the modern site of the ancient Larsa (Ellasar), and that they were written during the first dynasty of Babylon, although in only a few cases is it possible to determine the reign to which they belong. Ancient letters owe their preservation to the fact that they formed part of royal or temple archives, and their contents are usually of a business or official character. These letters are for the most part business communications which do not add much that is new to the known data of legal and business contracts. This is, however, far from denying the worth of such publications, for they justify themselves on the linguistic and economic side. It is a matter of considerable interest to find the name Abraham written out fully for the first time in cuneiform, *A-ba-ra-ḥa-am*. The antiquity of the name was placed beyond dispute when Professor Ungnad found the name *Ab(am)râma* in contract tablets from Dilbat, dated in the reign of Ammizaduga, the fourth successor of Hammurabi. In the Karnak list of places conquered by Sheshonk I, the contemporary of Rehoboam, the Field of Abram is mentioned, and an official under Esarhaddon (677 B.C.) bears the name *Abi-râmu*. Dr. Lutz maintains — in the writer's opinion correctly — that *A-ba-ra-ma*, *A-ba-am-ra-ma*, *A-ba-am-ra-am*, and *A-ba-ra-ḥa-am* stand for one and the same name; that these are



foreign renderings of a West Semitic name אַבְרָהָם, which was re-introduced in the West in its Babylonian form, subject to the usual variation in foreign names, including the orthography with ה. It goes without saying that the word-play of Genesis 17 5 has no philological basis. So far as we know, the name was from the beginning a personal name and there is no evidence that there ever was a tribe Abram or Abraham. This discovery of the personal name in Babylonia during the first dynasty of Babylon is obviously not a corroboration of the statement that the particular person called Abraham lived in Ur and migrated to Canaan (Genesis 11 28, 31).

The admirable transliteration and translation of thirty-three selected texts is welcome to the student and general reader alike, and we hope that Dr. Lutz will be able to carry out his original plan of translating all of the letters contained in this volume. A few errors — some of them merely typographical — may be listed. On page 8, no. 106: 4 is transliterated<sup>il</sup> *Šamaš ù<sup>il</sup> Marduk li-ba-al-li-tu-ku-nu-ti*, “may Shamash and Marduk preserve your life.” Inasmuch as the letter is addressed to two persons, the plural pronoun *kunûti* is to be expected, but the cuneiform text on plate XXXIX has the singular pronoun *ka*. Has Dr. Lutz unconsciously corrected a grammatical error on the part of the original writer, or has he himself made one in copying? On page 12, no. 25: 5 is transliterated *aš-sum di-nim.ša Ilu-su-i-bi-[su]*. No break is indicated in the text of this line on plate X, which reads: *aš-sum di-nim.ša Ilu-su-i-bi-i arad<sup>il</sup> Sin*. A collation of the text might well reveal *sū* instead of *i*, as the same name in line 13 indicates. The name occurs in no. 83:5 with the title *barū* (diviner) instead of *arad Sin*. On page 26, line 8 of no. 1, *aš-sum te-e-mi-im.ša um-ma at-ta-a-ma* has been entirely omitted from the transliteration, and in the translation it is enclosed in parentheses! The numbering of the lines follows the transliteration rather than the cuneiform text, and therefore falls short by one line. In line 19 (numbered 18) *sa-a-ti* has been omitted in the transliteration but appears in parentheses in the translation. On page 28 (no. 32: 8) we would suggest that the character transliterated *mana* — it is written *ma* — might perhaps be *siglu* (compare 12:8). In that case the redemption price would be within the known limits of the price of a male slave, instead of being “exorbitantly high.”

The copies of the tablets are exceedingly well executed, and we look forward with interest to the contributions that are to be expected from this scholar.

MARY I. HUSSEY.

MOUNT HOLYOKE COLLEGE.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE HEBREW PEOPLE. LAURA H. WILD. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1917. Pp. xii, 311. \$1.50.

This handy volume will serve the purpose of a manual for many people who need an easy introduction to the genius, content, and abiding significance of the Bible. The fields of ethnology, comparative religion, geography, sociology, and history, are drawn upon in good proportion and the author's wide reading has been sifted and compacted in a really interesting way. The preparation of the book follows apparently the author's experience in introducing the subject of early Hebrew culture to her undergraduate charges. In Part V we find but twenty pages devoted to the great subjects of the teachings of the Old Testament prophets, of Jesus, and of Paul. This is probably to be taken as a prospectus merely of another volume to follow the present one.

One of the notable and commendable points of the book is the sustained enthusiasm with which the variegated data are recalled and articulated. What is really a study of origins of the folk and phenomena of the Old Testament period may well help to an intelligent appreciation of that Levantine collection of writings, the Bible.

Such interest revealed and evoked is the main justification of this book. It ought to bring good results in many a group of students. Its success will not be affected by occasional slips, such as that on page 18, line 22, which popular English dictionaries like Webster's and the Standard will correct quickly enough for the pupils, or the wrong spelling of the name of the poet Vergil on pages 69 and 93. Such trustfulness as is shown on page 15 — "an inscription on a monument tells the truth" — is perhaps more dangerous. Professor A. T. Olmstead is showing by his painstaking studies that what we need is not so much Higher Criticism and the Monuments as Higher Criticism of the Monuments.

The author will by her suggestion of wide reading lead students to differ from her on certain points of interpretation, and will, like any good teacher, rejoice in the difference. The reviewer feels grateful whenever a competent teacher turns note-books into handy volumes of narrative or reference suitable for the rapid reading which the more eager students ought to do in quantity.

ELIHU GRANT.

HAVERFORD COLLEGE.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF WANG YANG-MING. TRANSLATED FROM THE CHINESE by F. G. HENKE. With an Introduction by J. H. Tufts. The Open Court Publishing Co. 1916. Pp. xix, 512. \$2.50.

MODERN MOVEMENTS AMONG MOSLEMS. SAMUEL G. WILSON. F. H. Revell Co. 1916. Pp. x, 305. \$1.50.

The Neoconfucian philosophy of China and Japan has for the most part taken its origin and direction from Chu Hi (died 1200 A.D.); but the later school of Wang Yang-ming (died 1529) has not been without influence in either country. Outside the small circle of professed sinologues the teachings of the latter have been little known, and all students of Oriental philosophy are the more indebted to Professor Henke for making them accessible in the present volume, which contains a translation of a biography of Wang Yang-ming, three books of "Instructions for Practical Life," a record of various discourses, and a collection of letters in answer to inquiries.

Professor Henke classifies Chu Hi as a realist, Wang Yang-ming as an idealist of the monistic type, who thought that nothing exists independent of and apart from mind. "The intuitive faculty," "intuitive knowledge," are words that recur on almost every page. "Nature" is another great word. "There is but one nature and no other. Referring to its substance, it is called heaven; considered as ruler or lord, it is called Shang-ti (God); viewed as functioning, it is called fate; as given to men, it is called disposition; as controlling the body, it is called mind. Manifested by mind, when one meets parents, it is called filial piety; when one meets the prince, it is called loyalty. Proceeding from this on, the category is inexhaustible, but it is all one nature, even as there is but one man (generic sense)."

Of mere erudition Wang Yang-ming has a poor opinion: "The food which has been eaten must be digested; for if it collects in the stomach, it causes dyspepsia. How can it under such circumstances become muscle? Later scholars read extensively and know much, but what they have read and know remains undigested. They all have dyspepsia."

The translation has evidently been made with care and reads very well.

So many absurd people have declaimed that Mohammedanism has never changed and can never change that the author of the second book above mentioned expects some of his readers to be surprised at the very title, *Modern Movements among Moslems*; and doubtless his exhibition of the multiplicity and variety of these move-

ments will be to many both novel and illuminating. Dr. Wilson was for more than thirty years a missionary in Persia, and writes about that country from his own observation. His information about other parts of the Moslem world is compiled from many and heterogeneous sources — exclusively, so far as appears, in English — without much critical discrimination, and is communicated in a fashion that frequently resembles leaves from a note-book more than anything else.

Modernity in any religion has to be set against a background of history, not only to show wherein it is new, but how it came to be at all. In history Dr. Wilson is sadly weak, especially in the history of Moslem theology. Al-Ashari is as outstanding a name as Athanasius; his relation to the Mutazilites and his position as one of the founders of an orthodox system of dogma are matters of elementary knowledge. The Mutazilites themselves — a kind of ethical rationalists — are one of the most interesting phenomena in the history of Islam; the influence of their way of thinking upon Shiite theology has been considerable, and in recent times the Moslem rationalists in India claim to inherit from them. In the latter connection the author touches incidentally on the subject. Two sentences are enough to prove that he has no knowledge either of the nature and significance of the Mutazilite movement or of the work of al-Ashari. In the former he sees the influence of Persian thought; of the latter he writes: "Al Askari (*sic!* and so in the index), using as his weapon the dialectic of Aristotle and teaching Greek logic to the orthodox, gave them the victory and established rigid legalism and traditionalism in Islam." Stanley Lane-Poole and Geden are quoted as authorities for this, but the fault is not theirs. This is a glaring example, but it is by no means a solitary one.

Even with the Koran the author seems to have a somewhat superficial acquaintance. He quotes as a "saying of the Koran" the words, "I desired to be known, therefore I created the world," which sound as little like Mohammed's God as can be imagined. The argument on page 85 about Sura 9, verses 5 and 29, erroneously assumes that the verses form part of the same deliverance because they stand in the same Sura.

It is an affectation to write Arabic words in English as a modern Persian pronounces them, but that might pass if they were consistently written on any system. In one place we read, "*La illa ill Allah*," in another, "*La illah ill' Allah*." Both are grammatical monstrosities easier to credit to an English ear than a Persian mouth. Now we have "Jaffar" and then again "Jafar." Some of the strange



spelling is probably to be attributed to negligent proof-reading; for example, Almohayes, Wofing, *responsa prudentum*, Kaimal Pasha, *Frangi mahab*, and the like. What to say of Ittahad, Ali Allahis, I do not know.

GEORGE FOOT MOORE.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

RELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND HERESY IN THE MIDDLE AGES. F. W. BUSSELL.  
Robert Scott, London. 1918. Pp. xiv, 878. 21s.

One's first query in regard to this exceedingly thick book is how, under present conditions in England, the author and the publisher could command the paper needed for the volume and the labor required to set it up. The book might well have waited till the war was over, and even longer. One also queries why the author chose his title, since only the last two hundred and fifty pages deal with the Middle Ages, or at least with those of western Europe. The previous six hundred and odd pages have been given to "Hindustan and the Religions of Further Asia" (pp. 11-300); to "Islam: its Sects and Philosophy" (pp. 300-508); and to "Greek Thought and Chaldeism: the Nearer East and Christian Heresy" (pp. 509-644). The work is thus a survey of the chief religions of the world.

The author has read many books and studied long. Whether he has any synoptical enlightenment of his own to contribute or the ability to give form and soul to his stupendous chaos of material, is another question, to which we fear the answer cannot be in the affirmative. An informing mind throughout the work is far to seek; nor do we find the author's style pregnant, or his method and presentation calculated to hold the reader's attention; neither is his comment particularly wise.

We say this much of the first six hundred and fifty pages. The author seems to grow weary as he enters upon the nominal subject of his labors. "Authority and Free Thought in the Middle Ages" is the title of the last general division. The heading of his first paragraph, in heavy type — "Gregory I as Starting Point for Western Development" — seems to preclude the idea that the prior four-fifths of the work have any explanatory value for what is now to be "briefly reviewed." "The period to be now briefly reviewed is held to extend from Gregory I (c. 600) to the catastrophe of the Papacy under Boniface VIII; though a glance may be given at the issues and developments in a yet later age, and we may have to include (for some purposes) the period ending with the settlement of the

Turks in Europe (1453)." Such is the wandering statement. We note that the following section treats of St. Augustine and Pelagius! Some of the paragraph-headings are naïve enough: "Erigena conveys Greek learning into the West;" *whence* is not indicated.

There is little more to be said. In the next two hundred pages the writer continues vainly endeavoring to assort his materials. The last sentence in the text (p. 806), which immediately precedes some seventy pages of "Supplementary Essays" in fine print, is enigmatical and portentous: "The remaining chapters of this book aim at tracing the evolution of modern State-sovereignty and the collapse of the idealistic standards and moral convictions to which the Middle Age has always (at least in theory) clung. They will be little more than a commentary or a paraphrase of texts or statements already familiar in these pages." Is it possible that a shortage of paper and type alone prevented another volume?

HENRY OSBORN TAYLOR.

NEW YORK.

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MYSTICISM. CHARLES MORRIS ADDISON.  
E. P. Dutton & Co. 1918. Pp. x, 216. \$1.50.

Dr. Addison has written a sane, modest, and useful book. It is sane, because he refuses to dwell upon the extravagances of mysticism, barely mentioning ecstasy and keeping silence about levitation and such-like phenomena, but representing mysticism as continuous with well-recognized elements of mental life in general and the religious life in particular; It is modest, because he does not write as one who has attained, but rather as one who is on his way to a goal which is divined through the testimony of more advanced pilgrims and of which he too has caught encouraging glimpses. It is useful, in that he emphasizes the way rather than the goal, dealing more with the practice than the theory, with the science only as it bears upon the art of mysticism. In the present revival of interest in the subject, the tendency is to expound and defend the theory instead of promoting the practice, although the mystics themselves are unanimous that one must practically apprehend before he can theoretically comprehend the experiences which they relate.

So far as theory goes, the teaching of the book is perfectly simple. Man, every man, has longings which God alone can satisfy. To receive this satisfaction, he has a spiritual sense variously named by the mystics as spark, scintilla, *apex mentis*, synteresis, known to

theologians as faith, to philosophers as insight or intuition; but this, like all other senses, needs cultivation for its proper functioning. How then shall it be cultivated? At this point we pass from theory to practice, and here the author's chief word is Contemplation. When the desire for God becomes strong enough to induce us to fix our minds upon Him, to think of Him with prolonged and steady concentration, then one is in the mystic's way, headed and hearted towards the mystic's goal. There is also a most suggestive plea for spaces of silence both in private devotion and in the worship of the church. There is a wide-spread notion that in public worship "something must be doing all the time," that moments are wasted, and worse than wasted, which are not fully occupied by the choir, the clergyman, or the brethren; but the Friends know better, and so do all who have tried a more excellent way in which time is given to stop and think. One recalls the description of a church service attributed to Dr. Burton of Hartford, in which after much utterance from the pulpit and much "ballooning by the choir," there came at last "silence, and the restored presence of God."

W. W. FENN.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

A MANUAL OF THE HISTORY OF DOGMAS. Vol. I, The Development of Dogmas during the Patristic Age, 100-869. Rev. BERNARD J. OTTEN, S.J. B. Herder, St. Louis. 1917. Pp. xiv, 523. \$2.00.

This is a really interesting book. Its frankness, its clearness of statement, its freedom alike from controversial bitterness and pietistic unction, commend it not only to the faithful Catholic for whom it is primarily intended but to the Protestant reader as well. Its character as a Manual for students is well maintained throughout. It does not pretend to give detailed discussion of specific points, but aims rather, first to state with precision and with the certainty derived from infallible authority the Catholic position on the most important topics of the Christian faith, and then to show how this position has been defined from age to age.

The use of the plural word "dogmas" characterizes at once the author's attitude toward his subject. It is not a body of thought carried on by successive generations of freely thinking men with which he is concerned, but a series of propositions based upon a superhuman revelation and handed down through the medium of an "infallible teaching authority." How then can there be a history

of dogmas? If by "history" we mean anything more than a mere list of statements about what has happened, what room is there in this definition of dogmas for any real historical process? Our author anticipates this inquiry and answers it immediately by drawing a distinction between revealed truths as "objectively permanent and immutable," while "their subjective apprehension and outward expression admit(s) of progress."

And not only is progress in dogma possible, but "development" as well. Indeed one feels that Professor Otten is particularly anxious to set this word free from its Catholic *tabu*. He uses it in his title and employs it continually as if to relieve his Church and himself from the reproach of a too rigid conservatism. He even recognizes a certain merit in "heresies" as contributing to the ever more complete enunciation of the truths contained in the primary and objective revelation. His own function he conceives to be to show how the "original deposit entered into Christian consciousness in later ages."

From such a beginning it is evident that in stating the views of Christian theologians from one age to another no vital relation is implied between these views and the movement of human thought in general which we call philosophy. Dogmas are a separate and special treasure confided to a specially constituted guardianship and to be preserved at all costs from outward contamination. The "subjective" element has rights only in so far as it confines itself within prescribed limits. No matter how absurd or foolish or impossible a "dogma" may be, the individual has no right to oppose it so long as the "infallible teaching authority" sees fit to let it stand on the list of accepted truths, or even on occasion deliberately to place it there. If he is tempted beyond the line of authorization, he becomes a "heretic," and that is of itself a condemnation.

The learning of our author is shown chiefly in his ability to quote proof-texts from the recognized authorities in the line of patristic succession. Beyond this he does not go and needs not to go; for the public to which he addresses himself this piling up of human authorities is enough. The principle that no amount of evidence can prove an impossibility has no place in this peculiar intellectual world. Yet it is refreshing to note certain consequences of this method. On the most critical points there is a solid consistency and definiteness in the use of language which disarms hostile comment from the start. With Fr. Otten a miracle is a miracle and there-with — *basta!* Here is no talk of "luminous surprises" or any other of the juggling devices by which ingenious theologians have sought



to obscure the clear line between the world of miracle and the world of law. Not merely is "the miraculous" a reality but miracles as well, and the Church is there to define and authenticate them.

This principle once established, there is no difficulty in maintaining any specific dogma, as, for example, the doctrines of Purgatory, resurrection of the body, intercession of saints, the veneration of Mary. The obvious fact that we have no knowledge whatever on which to build belief in the physical phenomena involved in these several highly important dogmatic propositions can have no effect upon minds prepared in advance by training in the docile acceptance of the "infallible teaching authority."

But while Fr. Otten raises no question as to such specific dogmas as these, it should in all fairness be pointed out that he is careful to show the varieties of opinion which were expressed about them in the period before their "definition" by the Church. Those who opposed them were, of course, in error, for their "objective truth" was as true before definition as afterward; only this error was due to the delay of the "subjective apprehension" in grasping the particular mystery involved, and was, therefore, pardonable. This readiness to show both sides of the process is still more marked in the more highly speculative subjects, such as the doctrines of the Trinity and the problems of Free Will and Grace. Our author's attitude on this matter is well stated by him in one of his illuminating little introductions, that to Chapter XXIX. He reminds his readers that, in spite of all controversy, the teaching of the Church was not "vague and uncertain" even before "she was called upon to give a final definition." He compares religious controversies in the history of dogmas to the wars described in the history of nations as "abnormal accidents," as "manifestations of passion rather than of reason, or at best a manifestation of reason misguided in its quest after truth."

Put this view of doctrinal controversy, not to say this conception of history, together with the statement immediately following, that the christological decisions of eastern councils were all "dictated" by the popes, and we have a complete presentation of Fr. Otten's qualification for his task. His work is frank, clear, and consistent, and for these reasons valuable to the student.

EPHRAIM EMERTON.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

A DEFENCE OF IDEALISM. SOME QUESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS. MAY SINCLAIR. The Macmillan Co. 1917. Pp. xxii, 355. \$2.00.

Plato's philosopher among kings plays no more unusual rôle than this novelist among philosophers. But disappointment is in store for any reader who takes up Miss Sinclair's book in the hope of finding a "metaphysics made easy." He will discover no simplified, superficial re-wording of other people's conclusions but rather an independent and critical study of fundamental doctrines. Miss Sinclair reaches her own position by way of a criticism of "the pan-psychism of Samuel Butler," of "vitalism" as emphasized in the teaching of Bergson, of "pragmatism and humanism," of "neo-realism," and of "the new mysticism."

She starts out with the statement (p. 1) that "the plain man is supposed . . . to be sure that whatever else he is or isn't, he is himself," and is thus led to inquire "what we mean by Individuality, by Personal Identity, and by a Self." There follows a long exposition of Butler's doctrine, largely irrelevant to the main purpose of the book and somewhat uncritical in its adoption of Butler's conception of heredity, but abounding in valuable comment and comparison. One may note, in particular, Miss Sinclair's comparison of Butler to the psychoanalysts in their common emphasis on the "Will-to-live and to-make-live," and her suggestive re-statements of the results of psychoanalysis, which she precedes by the observation (p. 4): "Granting . . . that we know what we mean by the Unconscious . . . I see no reason why it should overflow with things hideous and repulsive any more than with beautiful and attractive things." Her enumeration of the significant conceptions of psychoanalysis follows: "Only three conceptions more or less coherent: a conception of the Will-to-live, valid as far as it goes but vague, and bound up with a conception of the Unconscious worse than vague, . . . a conception of Sublimation, by which this Will-to-live perpetually transcends itself and is made manifest in higher and higher and more and more complex forms of life, . . . a conception of the Individual as a being of immense importance, seeing that just those forces within and without him which arrest and retard his individuality are backward forces" (p. 9). In spite, however, of Miss Sinclair's interest in Butler, her conclusion (p. 13) that "the Unconscious resolves itself into a negative abstraction" of course involves her in strong opposition to him in his denial of personal identity to the individual. She argues (p. 33) that "not the simplest fact of consciousness, not the simplest operation of building up a primordial germ-cell, is possible without the presupposition of personal identity."

There is room to question Miss Sinclair's confident classification (p. 56) of Bergson as a metaphysical dualist—in truth, she herself later questions it. But her criticism of him is keen and in the main discriminating. It culminates in the assertion (p. 63) that Bergson has gone wrong in that “he has put Pure Time before the Self. He has given to Time that special form of continuity, the duration that belongs only to a self.”

At this point, led by these introductory studies to the discovery of self as basal fact, Miss Sinclair devotes a chapter to the consideration, under McDougall's guidance, of “some ultimate questions of psychology.” This chapter is mainly concerned with the issue between parallelism and interactionism, and the author concludes that McDougall “has justified the hypothesis of a self or soul” and that he has vindicated interactionism. But this, Miss Sinclair points out, leaves the metaphysician with the problem on his hands of explaining interaction. In her fourth chapter she proceeds to consider the rival explanations of the philosophers. She argues briefly against materialism on the ground (p. 113) that the materialist “must either admit that consciousness does not come altogether into his net, or he must break his own sacred law of the conservation of energy”; against the doctrine of the “underlying Unknown and Unknowable” on the ground (p. 115) that its upholders “have to assume it to be knowable and indeed known in order to prove that it is there at all”; and finally, against the very different theory of “objective idealism,” by which apparently she means a pluralistic, intellectualistic, and relatively impersonal form of idealism, a theory which conceives the universe as a system of percepts and ideas. The teaching of the objective idealist is thus summarized (p. 121): “He has cut the Thing-in-itself very cleverly out of the problem, and packed all Reality into states of consciousness; not my states or your states, but all the states of all the consciousness there is; so that the sum of Reality will be simply the sum of the states. . . . But Totality, the sum of all states, must be more real than any one state or any number of states; so that his Reality is purely quantitative, and every lapse of consciousness, no matter whose or what — and these lapses are constantly occurring — will be a *dead loss of reality to the Universe.*”

All this is, however, in a way preliminary to Miss Sinclair's main purpose. The vital philosophical issue is, she believes, that which divides pluralistic neo-realism from idealism of the monistic and personalistic type. For a brief chapter's length she pauses to brush aside pragmatism and humanism with decisive though with regretful

hand. For though she abhors "William James's way of thinking," she "adores his way of writing" (p. vii). "To be just to pragmatism and humanism," she concludes (p. 148), "they have deserved well of philosophy in reminding it of things it is apt to forget; little things like Will and action and moral conduct." But she concludes that pragmatism "is a method and not a philosophy," and might well have argued the point even had she not confined her attention to one group only of the pragmatists.

Incomparably the most important part of the book, in the mind not only of the present reviewer but of the author, is the long and critical discussion of neo-realism. Miss Sinclair is profoundly, perhaps inordinately, impressed with the importance of this youngest and most vociferous claimant to metaphysical honor. She agrees (p. 153) with those who concede to the new realism a "deadly force." And she attributes this force mainly to the "method of Mr. Bertrand Russell's 'atomistic logic'" as applied "to the universe without and to the universe within." To the neo-realists she yields two points: first, that by their conception of space and time as continuous they cut out the ground from under Kant's old idealistic argument from the antinomies; second, that "all the qualities of matter are in the same boat; there is no difference between primary and secondary qualities" (p. 175). But she elaborates her suspicion (pp. 225 ff.) that the doctrine of space as absolute continuity involves its own antinomies; and against neo-realism she urges with great skill and vigor the following considerations:

First, in flat opposition to its own pretensions, it flies in the face of science and common sense (p. 216 *et al.*). "It divides what for science and the plain man's sense were never yet divided. It joins what for them were never yet joined. It talks about irreducibles and undefinables where science and the plain man see palpable unities and relations. It gives to the abstractions of its own logic a reality as august and far more permanent than the solar system." In other words, neo-realism is palpably untrue to experience in its attempt to reduce perceived objects to mathematical or logical reals. "Mind is not more different from matter than mathematical points are from a point perceived in an extended surface" (p. 214).

The realist, in the second place, undermines his own theory by his treatment of hallucination and image as real in the sense in which perceived objects are real. "Take hallucinations of the lesser sort, the temporary distortions . . . of perception . . . of a real outside object. These . . . are due to some . . . maladjustment of the apparatus (the medium) — easily corrected, the new realist says,



by . . . reference to the real object" (p. 219). But "if the distortion of the medium can make one perceive the real object as if it were distorted . . . it is clear that his perception of objects . . . is not precisely . . . immediate. How can he then be sure — as cock-sure as the realist is — that he is perceiving a reality and not an appearance?" (p. 220).

Neo-realism, furthermore, discloses an inherent inconsistency (pp. 220 ff.) in admitting the subjectivity of certain "tertiary qualities . . . the æsthetic feelings . . . the passions and emotions." For we do not find "the tertiary qualities, which it admits to be subjective, divided off from the secondary or objective ones as sharply as we should expect."

Finally and impressively Miss Sinclair argues that "universals" which the neo-realist reinstates "are a priceless haul for the idealist. . . . If realists *will* revive Plato," she adds, "they must abide by the consequences of the resurrection" (p. 231). "What, in Heaven's name," she cries, "are realities defined as independent of any and every thought, of any and every consciousness, doing in a process of thinking which is nothing if not conscious?" Another difficulty for the neo-realist is found in the fact that "there is a universal of every actual . . . and of every possible proposition." For since "the number of propositions is infinite," and since "for every true proposition there is a false proposition that denies its truth . . . therefore there will be an . . . infinite number of universals standing for an infinite number of lies" (p. 234). Miss Sinclair does "not see how reality can be claimed for these objects of conception if reality has any meaning" (p. 235).

The multiplied proofs of the inner inconsistency of neo-realism, its most formidable rival, leaves monism, or the doctrine of the "real Absolute," in possession of the field. Miss Sinclair unequivocally sets forth this form of monism — the conclusion "that the ultimate reality of things and the ultimate reality of consciousness is one; and that this one reality is Spirit" (p. 295) — as the hypothesis most in keeping with the facts. She devotes a chapter, full of interesting but largely irrelevant detail, to the distinction of this reasoned monism from mysticism in its varied forms. In her concluding pages she re-states and re-emphasizes the main features of her conception of the "infinite Spirit" or "Self" which "*is* all relations and all terms and is more than the sum of all terms and relations" (p. 210). This doctrine, she insists, though it meets the realist's dilemma by providing a distinction between true and false, does not rob a single fact of "its own peculiar and relative reality"

(p. 305). "Existence remains as full-blooded and gorgeously colored, as variegated and multitudinous, as everlastingly . . . surprising" as ever (p. 309). The "multiplicity and change" which realism finds in the universe, monism also finds (p. 306); but it argues (p. 306 f.) that there cannot be "multiplicity without something that multiplies itself, or change without something that persists throughout change." Finally, this doctrine of "one infinite Spirit" conceives a plurality of finite selves "held together by one Real Self . . . without loss to the integrity of one finite item of the finite complex, without rupture to the unity of the one Self" (p. 338). The psychological possibility that "the selfhood of the finite selves" can be maintained "in and through their fusion with the infinite Self" is shown, Miss Sinclair believes, in certain "forms of dream-consciousness" (pp. 335 ff.).

The readers of this notice will already have realized that the writer of it closely agrees with Miss Sinclair in her essential position and cordially respects the strength and the skill of her argument. This agreement and respect do not however blind the reviewer to certain defects in the book. Some of these are purely formal: the staccato movement of the paragraphs, the wearisome vivacity of style and phraseology, and the unaccountable lack of an index. Other criticisms concern Miss Sinclair's choice and neglect of authorities. When she says simply that where she has "touched on General Psychology" she has "invariably followed Mr. McDougall as the best available authority," the sincerest admirer of Mr. McDougall may be pardoned not only for smiling a little at her insularity but for remembering that she need not have left the sanctuary of British psychology to consult also Stout and (more to her special advantage) Ward. When she disavows (p. 202 *et al.*) Bradley's argument to the Absolute from the impossibility of the infinite regress, one wishes that she had cited the Supplementary Essay of Royce's "The World and the Individual," First Series. And one wishes even more eagerly that her brilliant (though rather mystical) speculation (p. 338) on the whirl of appearances into reality by an increase in "the pace of the rhythm of time" had been strengthened and perhaps sobered by a study of Royce's conception of the differing time-spans, as distinguishing selves of different orders.<sup>1</sup> The mention of Bradley suggests also the comment that Miss Sinclair might have made the distinction, necessary to idealism of the monistic type, between lesser reality and ultimate reality, without retaining Bradley's misleading "appearance" as the unvaried contrasting term to "reality."

<sup>1</sup> The World and the Individual, Series II, Lecture V, pp. 228 ff.

A more significant comment may be made on Miss Sinclair's superficial reference (p. 289) to the contrast between the Absolute and God. Truly, philosophy is not religion, and the object of the one is not necessarily identical with that of the other. Yet reasoned thinking may supplement personal feeling or loyalty; and nothing forbids the religious attitude toward the Absolute, conceived in Miss Sinclair's terms as Self or Spirit. A final comment has to do with Miss Sinclair's teaching about the self. As the preceding summary has shown, this is a concept basal both to Miss Sinclair's doctrine and to her method. Reality, in her view, *is* a Self manifested in selves; and the argument for this conclusion throughout makes appeal to every man's experience of himself. It is to be regretted, therefore, that at the outset of Chapter III, Miss Sinclair presents so needlessly confused an account of that "ultimate fact," as she later (p. 297) truly calls it, the self. For though "irreducible," the self is not therefore indescribable. And it must be added that, as Miss Sinclair proceeds, her conception of self gains definiteness and precision as that of a unifying, changing, persisting perceiver, imaginer, thinker, feeler, or willer. There is danger, however, in her reiterated assertions that the self is a "pure" self (p. 318), a self "over and above its own experience" (p. 317). Miss Sinclair may mean no more by these statements than that the self is "more than the sum of its states" (p. 297), that it is no mere impersonal "totality" of experiences, memories, feelings, and the like, regarded without reference to any self. She runs the risk, however, by the words "pure" and "beyond" and "over" of being interpreted as if she subscribed to the outlawed doctrine of soul-substance, non-conscious self. For though one cannot too emphatically assert the existence of a self that is not a mere "percept" or "feeling," one must insist with equal fervor that the only real self is a self who is conscious, a perceiving, thinking, feeling, or willing self.

MARY WHITON CALKINS.

WELLESLEY COLLEGE.

A REALISTIC UNIVERSE. An Introduction to Metaphysics. JOHN E. BOODIN. The Macmillan Co. 1916. Pp. xxii, 412.

In a previous work, *Truth and Reality*, Professor Boodin had already described himself as a "rabid realist." Truly enough, he is a realist as tested by the one point of doctrine on which all realists agree, namely, that neither the existence nor the qualities of objects

depend upon or are constituted by their being apprehended by a mind. But beyond this point Professor Boodin's realism parts company with that of all other realists known to me. Though, like them, he describes his book as "an attempt to apply scientific method to philosophical problems," he does not employ the logico-analytic method of mathematics which, if we are to believe Mr. Bertrand Russell, is the only truly scientific method and the only salvation of philosophy. So far from atomizing the universe into ultimate simples, Professor Boodin describes the "neutral entities" of his fellow-realists as survivals of an antiquated metaphysics, and insists that things always occur in concrete empirical contexts, and that we must study them by "taking account of the whole situation." Thus, the entry of a thing into a "cognitive context," that is, its becoming an object of "interest" to a mind, makes, for him, a most important difference to the thing, which thereby acquires "significance or meaning." Clearly, Professor Boodin's realism is so little "rabid" that he will very likely be accused by his fiercer fellow-realists of having dressed up the old idealistic donkey in the skin of the neo-realistic lion.

As a matter of fact, it is not easy to discover why Professor Boodin calls his method "scientific." Is it because he talks in terms of "energy-systems" and incorporates much scientific theory in his metaphysical edifice? Or is he merely following the strange fashion which leads so many modern philosophers into aping the gestures and accents of science? Or, lastly, does he mean no more than that to be scientific is to be "empirical and critical"? At any rate, if he is right — and I believe him to be right — in regarding philosophers as "men who can think in terms of the whole," then philosophy has nothing to learn from science. For science is simply not "empirical" enough in this sense. Scientists never think in terms of the whole, nor do they ever use the whole range of experience. They work with specific concepts on selected groups of data. *A fortiori*, if Professor Boodin is right in saying that philosophy "exists in part for ennobling life" ("the function of both art and metaphysics is to idealize life"), it is not easy to see in what way the procedure of the sciences offers any model whatever for philosophy. Is it not high time that philosophers acquired the courage to preach what, anyhow, they practise, namely, that philosophy has its own method and does not need to live on the crumbs that fall from the table of science?

In addition to being scientific, Professor Boodin is also "pragmatic." Sometimes he appears to mean no more by this than



making one's intuitions and beliefs clear and consistent. If so, we are all glad enough to be pragmatists of this sort, and to welcome an old friend under a new name when we read of the "pragmatic postulate . . . that reality is what it manifests itself to be in its varying contexts." But when we read elsewhere that pragmatism requires us to judge the nature of reality "by the consequences to the realization of human purposes," and, hardly less vaguely, that "philosophies must do justice to our whole human nature; they must satisfy our emotional and volitional nature, as well as our intellectual," we feel bound to enter a *caveat* that philosophy has no business to satisfy any demands of our nature until it has first interpreted what they mean and by arduous and searching criticism given to them the form in which alone they deserve to be satisfied. Else our so-called ideals will shelter nothing but foolishness and self-will. What, I think, Professor Boodin means is that no philosophy can hope to stand which declares moral and æsthetic experience to have no foundation in the nature of things, and religion to be a mere whim and superstition. Still, when he talks of metaphysics as "idealizing," and as building "air castles for the spirit, as we build houses for the body, to keep out the blast and cold of an unfriendly and fickle cosmic weather," I feel that he comes altogether too near the dangerous doctrine of protective make-believe. He looks like running away from the problem whether the cosmic weather is "really" fickle and unfriendly; that is, whether for one who can think in terms of the whole, the universe, even with actual evil and misfortune in it, does not after all embody the eternal values. He is too fond of the phrase "taking things at their face-value," where I should have thought that the first lesson to be learned from the great thinkers whom Professor Boodin too acknowledges as his masters, is that first appearances are not to be trusted in philosophy.

Five "ultimate and generic concepts" characterize Professor Boodin's universe. They are energy, consciousness, space, time, and form. In a finely imaginative first chapter he describes these five pillars of the world of his philosophic vision with the eloquence of a prose-poem. In a strictly technical last chapter he presents the same vision in the austere severity of a learned terminology. The general impression which one carries away is of a universe of energy-systems in spatio-temporal relations. Space conditions "translation" or "free mobility." Time conditions "transformation," that is, change, growth, decay; the flux-aspect of reality, which, notwithstanding relative identity and stability, yields ever the different and the novel. Energy-systems are of different sorts and types, material,

mental, social; and some presuppose others. Energy is the "stuff character" of the universe, what gives it "being." But with the evolution of a certain type of energy-system, there is added, as (so to speak) a free gift by grace of the universe, the "light of consciousness," a neutral awareness without variety, color, or direction of its own but illuminating all else in the world which without this light would have no significance or value. What, lastly, of form? Form is the principle of direction and organization in the "world of stuff and process." "Energy moulded into form, form expressed in energy — the perfect life." Form inheres in process, and shapes it "not by production but by elimination." It is selective; it conditions survival. In our consciousness it appears as the ideals which we ever seek to realize and to find realized in the world. In these ideals we become conscious of "the law of the whole." Ought is "the consciousness of the form-character of the universe." "The untiring search of our mind for order, faulty and stumbling though it is in execution, is somehow a reflex of the world of which mind is the conscious expression." By this concept of directive form, Professor Boodin claims to "make purposive significance possible without stopping the universe," and thus to escape "between the Scylla of materialism and the Charybdis of static idealism." It must, by the way, always remain a puzzle how Professor Boodin, in a book dedicated "to my friend and teacher Josiah Royce," can write, in the manner of William James' "moral holiday" argument, of the absolute as fit only for "tired souls, who want rest above all other things." What, one wonders helplessly, was it in the life and teaching of Royce that suggested so ludicrous a travesty of his strenuous and manly thinking?

About Professor Boodin's way of fitting religion and God into his universe I am not very clear. From his emphasis on time, activity, and ideals one expects him, like James, to be a meliorist. Yet in his account of religion I seem to catch the voice of the mystic rather than the meliorist. "In our religious loyalty we feel that our ideals are concretely realized. Religion . . . adds the sense of completeness, of unification, and of conservation to our finite ideal strivings. . . . The end of life is to transcend finality, in the sense of abstract ideals with their sense of obligation, and to reach spontaneity — unity of form and content, perfect activity. . . . This living unity we worship as God."

Philosopher-wise, I seem to have used most of my space for critical growls at a few things with which I disagree, and to have said over-little of the countless good things in this book. The chapters on

the existence and knowledge of things seem to me excellent throughout. The theory that consciousness is distinct from mind, which latter is an "energy-system," is very original and ingenious, and deserves a much fuller and more technical discussion than I can give it here. The same is true of the contents of the chapters on space and time. Incidentally, I noted some striking observations on immortality, individual and social. Altogether Professor Boodin has written a book of exceptional interest and value, accurate and ample in scholarship, rich and varied in range, original in its total vision of the world. It is much to be hoped that the distractions of the war will not rob it of the audience whose attention it will generously reward.

R. F. ALFRED HOERNLÉ.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF EDWARD EVERETT HALE. EDWARD E. HALE, JR.  
2 vols. Little, Brown, & Co. 1917. Vol. I, pp. 390; Vol. II, pp. 442.  
\$5.00.

This biography should have appeared at least a half-dozen years ago in order to meet the public's interest at its flood tide. Dr. Hale died in 1909, and this volume bears the date 1917. In those eight intervening years many of his associates have died, and the world has moved on, forgetfully, so that the book will not receive so wide a reading as it deserves.

The two volumes are interesting chiefly because the subject himself was an interesting personality. His life extended through a period of eighty-seven years, and the records which he left — letters, diaries, books, and magazine articles — furnished abundant material of a most readable sort for the hand of his son and biographer.

Readable as the book is, however, specially to those who knew Dr. Hale in person, it could have been made much more attractive and expository if its author had not almost wholly eliminated incidents and anecdotes. He has held, quite conventionally, to the epistolary method. But he might have interspersed, among the letters, some of the scores of interesting and illuminating anecdotes which his father's friends could have contributed, and the book would thereby have been greatly enriched. Such material does accomplish much toward the revealing of a man's character. Indeed, this was Dr. Hale's own belief. On page 57 of Volume II he is quoted as saying that a good way to write a biography would be for a hundred friends to write one incident, each, of the man. This method the son did not approve; and the result is that the book



leaves in shadow a considerable segment of Dr. Hale's circle of life. Perhaps the author-son held, all too consistently, to the purpose which he sets forth in his preface. "To try to criticise and estimate him has seemed no proper part of my work," he declares. That is an unfortunate and unfruitful position for a biographer to take. The result of it is that the book seriously lacks warmth and color. There is never a line of enthusiasm for the eminent and brilliant father. All the adjectives and adverbs of description from cover to cover are in the positive degree, never a superlative. Perhaps a great man is great neither to his valet nor his son. Whatever the explanation of the neutral tints which characterize the book, the disappointing fact is that this biography falls short of the adequate exposition of a great American's mind and heart, much as the uncouth bronze effigy in the Public Garden in Boston falls short of expressing his physical appearance.

The many-sidedness of Dr. Hale's nature was one of his most marked characteristics. This fact was brought out at a Browning meeting in Boston several years ago when the presiding officer introduced him with these words: "There are several Dr. Hales in this country. There is Dr. Hale the preacher and pastor, Dr. Hale the reformer, Dr. Hale the man of letters, Dr. Hale the philanthropist, Dr. Hale the historian, and others. Today I have the honor of introducing to you Dr. Hale the Browning scholar." This many-sidedness was sometimes adduced against Dr. Hale as evidence of his superficiality. But such criticism was itself superficial. Dr. Hale's genius lay in his wonderful capacity for entering into many diverse kinds of human activity, and in several of these he took rank among the best. Everybody knows that he wrote that splendid story, *The Man Without a Country*; but not so many know, in these days of war-and-peace debates, that he saw, years ago, that some form of arbitration or judicial procedure was the natural substitute for warfare. More than this, he saw and wrote and preached that war was the thing to be attacked rather than peace advocated. For war is a definite concrete evil; whereas peace is merely the absence of that evil, with the whole world engaged in its undisturbed occupations. A subtle distinction, but grasped by Dr. Hale many years ago. When the titles of Dr. Hale's numerous books are looked over, one sees that here was a man of wide range of interest, striking originality, and tireless activity. He was far removed from the specialist type, yet his knowledge of many subjects carried him much beyond the average man of the university graduate type. It was said of him sometimes that "he scattered too much." But



that was his genius. His mind was keen and originaive, and to whatever subject he applied it, it took him at once far out beyond mediocrity. In no subject did he stand absolutely at the top, but in a large number he became really eminent.

He possessed a keen dramatic sense in some directions, but lacked it in others. For example, his delivery of his sermons was individual and effective and excellent from the viewpoint of technique. He knew what he was doing and did it well. But in his stories, on the contrary, he seems to have had little technique. His fertile mind sprouted all kinds of ideas, and his one aim seemed to be to express himself with directness and simplicity, though without much regard for the reader's attitude. He once set forth, in his paper on *How to Do It*, some rules for writing. They were, "Know what you want to say, and say it; use your own daily language; leave out fine passages; choose the short word rather than the long, and the fewer words the better." These sententious instructions are quite too meagre and general to be of much practical value to the beginner. In the main he followed these rules in his own writing, but had he not been endowed richly with invention and literary skill, the world would never have given him the attention which it did give.

Similar to these rules for writing were his rules for talking. "Tell the truth; do not talk about your own affairs; confess ignorance; talk to the person who is talking to you; never underrate your interlocutor; and be short." Again it may be said that Dr. Hale followed his own rules here laid down. But the rare charm which his conversation had — and often it was monologue — was by no means due to these rules, but to his human sympathy, his unerring sense of values in construction, and his grace of intonation. His speaking, both public and private, showed a far deeper knowledge of the art of vocal expression than his few meagre rules gave hint of. Moreover, he developed a unique personal style. And that is the legitimate aim of every artist, whatever his form of art. Those persons who were fortunate enough to hear him read that incomparable sequence of drollery, his story, *My Double and How he Undid Me*, may have been deceived into thinking that it was all as simple and easy as it sounded. But it was really comedy of a high order.

The writer, and probably many other admirers of Dr. Hale, was struck often by the contrast between his sadness of countenance and his unfailing fountain of humor. He looked like a veritable "man of sorrows," but he roused happy smiles and laughter wherever

he went. The same contrast was exemplified in the case of Abraham Lincoln. In truth both those great men felt deeply the burden of the world's woe, and the counteracting saving force in their lives was their keen sense of humor. Yet in both of them the humor was not a thing apart from life but was an expression of some deep insight into human problems, and often was suggestive of their solution.

In these days, when definitions of the word "citizenship" are being made and unmade, it is good to touch anew the life of this eminent and loyal citizen. He was radical in many ways, but politically he often showed himself unexpectedly conservative. Always, however, in reforms or statesmanship or in his own chosen profession, he was constructive, stimulating, and inclined to the spirit rather than the letter. In brief, it may be said of him by one who knew and admired him, and it will be re-affirmed by thousands of similar persons, that he accepted his great gift of leadership as a real stewardship, and gave himself, in season and out of season, in public and in private, to the service of his fellow-men. In the words of Tennyson, when speaking of that other knightly soul, King Arthur, "He had power on this dark world to lighten it, and power on this dead world to make it live."

BRADLEY GILMAN.

PALO ALTO, CAL.

**THE HEART OF THE PURITAN.** Selections from Letters and Journals. ELIZABETH D. HANSCOM. The Macmillan Co. 1917. Pp. xiv, 281. \$1.50.

Lord Rosebery said, "The Puritan was a practical mystic, the most formidable and terrible of all combinations"; and Macaulay rounded out the portrait: "The Puritan prostrated himself in the dust before his Maker, but he set his foot upon the neck of his king. The intensity of his feelings on one subject made him tranquil on every other. Death had lost its terrors and pleasure its charms."

While this is true of the great moments of the Puritan's life, there were with him, as with all of us, many moments of less importance, in which this Samson would be like any other man. Professor Hanscom believes the heart can be distinctly felt throbbing in him; and she has brought together here, from a century and a half of New England history, selections from letters and journals which cast a flood of light upon the ordinary life of our Puritan forefathers — their dress, the furniture of their homes, their educational methods, trade, courtship, travel, amusements — for they had them — private



meditations, and public duty. A nobler instance of the last it would be hard to find than the public apology made by Samuel Sewall, who had been judge in the witchcraft trials at Salem, and who, four years afterwards, became convinced of the awful mistake that had been committed, and humbled himself in the meeting-house before God and the congregation (p. 247). The flirtation of "the young Gentlewoman of incomparable Accomplishments," whom Dr. Cotton Mather did not marry (p. 64 ff.), shows that hearts were designing and susceptible then as now.

Professor Hanscom has chosen her snap-shots well, and has appropriately prefaced them with a frontispiece taken from St. Gaudens' superb statue of Deacon Chapin as the ideal Puritan. The book should help to a better understanding of the Puritans and their history.

FREDERIC PALMER.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.